Docket 25-429
Blanche v. Lau
DecidedJun 23, 2026
6-3decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court rules border officers need no pre-set evidence standard to reclassify green card holders as admission-seekers
Impact5/10
What it does
The Court held that the INA does not require border officers to meet a "clear and convincing evidence" standard before reclassifying a returning green card holder as someone "seeking admission." The Government may satisfy any evidentiary burden it carries at the removal hearing itself — not necessarily at the border — using evidence gathered after the initial border decision. The Second Circuit's ruling imposing a clear-and-convincing standard on border officers was vacated, and the case was sent back for further proceedings on a separate question the lower court had not yet decided.
Who benefits
Federal immigration officers and prosecutors who initiate removal proceedings against returning lawful permanent residents charged with or convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, because they are no longer required to meet a specific evidentiary threshold at the moment of the border decision.
Who is affected
Lawful permanent residents (green card holders) who travel abroad and return to the United States while facing criminal charges, because they can be reclassified from "already admitted" to "seeking admission" at the border without the Government first meeting a defined evidence standard, exposing them to inadmissibility proceedings and the loss of their permanent green card pending resolution of their case.
Practical impact
Returning green card holders who have pending criminal charges can be reclassified as "seeking admission" at the border — losing their permanent green card and facing inadmissibility proceedings — without the Government first meeting a defined evidentiary standard at that moment. The Government can instead justify the reclassification at a later removal hearing using evidence, such as a subsequent guilty plea or conviction, gathered after the border decision was made. The case is sent back to the Second Circuit to decide the still-open question of whether Lau's specific offense (trademark counterfeiting) qualifies as a "crime involving moral turpitude."
Majority — Thomas
Joined by: Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett
The majority held that removing a lawful permanent resident on inadmissibility grounds is a two-step process: at step one, the Government only needs to show the resident committed a qualifying crime to treat him as "seeking admission"; at step two, a conviction (or admission of guilt) is needed to show he is actually inadmissible. The Court reasoned that nothing in the INA's text places a "clear and convincing evidence" burden on border officers at the moment of the border decision — the statute spells out specific burdens of proof in other situations but is silent on this one. The majority found that the Second Circuit invented its clear-and-convincing requirement by misreading Board of Immigration Appeals precedent, which itself only applies that standard at the removal hearing, not at the border. The Court also rejected the argument that a conviction must already exist before a green card holder can be reclassified, noting that the statute's plain text says "has committed" a crime — not "has been convicted of" one. Finally, the majority declined to impose on border officers — who must make quick, on-the-spot judgments — an evidentiary burden found nowhere in the statute or agency rules.
Dissent reasoning
The dissent argued that the majority's ruling ignores the plain command of the statute, which says a returning green card holder "shall not be regarded as seeking an admission" unless one of six specific exceptions applies — language that gives the Government no discretion to reclassify an LPR without first determining that an exception fits. Justice Jackson wrote that the statute's sequencing is clear: the border officer must make the threshold determination that an exception applies before demoting an LPR to "seeking admission" status, and that determination cannot be filled in later with evidence gathered after the fact. The dissent emphasized that reclassification is not a costless formality — it triggers confiscation of the permanent green card, potential detention or parole, a shift in the burden of proof to the LPR in removal proceedings, and years of legal uncertainty, as Lau's own 14-year limbo illustrates. The dissent also argued that the majority's reading allows the Government to assume an exception applies at the border with no evidence at all, so long as it can produce proof later — effectively letting the exceptions swallow the default rule Congress wrote to protect green card holders. Finally, the dissent contended that border officers already have the tools (databases, interviews, law enforcement records) to make this determination on the spot, so requiring them to do so would not cause the processing delays the Government feared.
Constitutional question
Does the Immigration and Nationality Act require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating that resident as someone "seeking admission" rather than as already admitted to the United States?
Precedent changed
The ruling narrows the Second Circuit's decision in Muk Choi Lau v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 42 (2025), vacating it; it also resolves a three-way circuit split among the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits on this question, aligning the law with the Fifth Circuit's approach in Luz Munoz v. Holder and the Ninth Circuit's approach in Vazquez Romero v. Garland.