Docket 24-983
Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.
DecidedMay 21, 2026
Source: CourtListener.
Cruise lines can be sued for using Cuban docks seized from an American company in 1960
What it does
The Court held that under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, a defendant can be liable for using physical property that the Cuban Government seized from an American — even if the American's original interest in that property was time-limited and would have expired before the defendant used it. The ruling reverses the Eleventh Circuit's requirement that plaintiffs show the defendant's conduct would have interfered with their property interest in a hypothetical world where no seizure occurred. The case is sent back to the lower court to address remaining defenses the Eleventh Circuit had not yet considered.
Who benefits
U.S. companies and individuals who held property interests in assets seized by the Cuban Government after 1959, and who have claims certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, now have a broader path to sue those who use that seized property.
Who is affected
Companies that conduct commercial operations — such as cruise lines, hotels, or other businesses — using property in Cuba that was seized from American claimants after 1959, regardless of whether the American's original interest in that property would still be active today.
Practical impact
The four cruise lines — Royal Caribbean, Norwegian Cruise Line, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises — face renewed liability exposure exceeding $100 million each, and the case returns to the Eleventh Circuit to resolve remaining defenses, including whether the cruises qualified as lawful travel under a statutory exception. More broadly, other businesses that have operated in Cuba using property with certified American claims may now face Title III lawsuits, and a concurring opinion flags unresolved questions about whether repeated or multiple uses of the same property could generate compounding liability far exceeding the original certified loss.
Majority — Thomas
Joined by: Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
The majority held that the phrase "property which was confiscated" in Title III refers to the physical property seized by the Cuban Government, not just the specific legal interest the plaintiff once held in it. The Court reasoned that the Act's own definition of "property" covers both physical things and intangible interests, and that the word "use" — one of the ways a person can "traffic" under the Act — naturally applies to physical things, not to someone else's abstract property interest. The majority rejected the Eleventh Circuit's counterfactual test — which asked whether the defendant's conduct would have interfered with the plaintiff's interest if no seizure had ever occurred — because that test is hard to apply and would actually block liability in clear-cut cases, such as when someone buys or sells a confiscated property interest. The Court concluded that once the Cuban Government seized the docks, those docks became "tainted" property, and anyone who knowingly uses them without the original claimant's permission can be held liable to that claimant. Because the cruise lines admittedly used the docks without Havana Docks' authorization, and Havana Docks holds a Commission-certified claim to those docks, the elements of a Title III claim were satisfied.
Dissent reasoning
In dissent, Justice Kagan argued that the majority misreads the statute by allowing recovery for trafficking in property that was never actually owned by the plaintiff. She reasoned that Havana Docks never owned the physical docks — Cuba always did — and what Havana Docks owned was only a time-limited right to use them, which was set to expire in 2004. Because the cruise lines used the docks in 2016–2019, more than a decade after that interest would have expired on its own, they did not traffic in the "property which was confiscated" from Havana Docks. The dissent argued that property rights have both spatial and temporal boundaries, and just as a plaintiff cannot recover for trafficking in a neighboring dock that was never part of its interest, it should not be able to recover for use of the docks after its time-limited interest had run out. Justice Kagan concluded that the majority's approach effectively converts every time-limited property interest into a permanent one, allowing claimants to recover indefinitely from anyone who ever uses the seized property — a result she argued Congress did not intend.
Constitutional question
Does the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act require a company suing for "trafficking in confiscated property" to prove that the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's specific property interest — or is it enough to show the defendant used the physical property that was seized, even if the plaintiff's time-limited interest in that property had already expired?