Docket 24-557
Villarreal
DecidedFeb 25, 2026
9-0decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court allows judges to bar lawyers from coaching a defendant's testimony during overnight trial recesses
Impact4/10
What it does
A trial judge may issue a "qualified conferral order" during an overnight recess that limits — but does not eliminate — a testifying defendant's ability to consult with his attorneys. Specifically, the judge may prohibit discussion of the defendant's ongoing testimony for its own sake (practicing it, adjusting it, or debriefing it), while still allowing the defendant to discuss all other topics with counsel, such as trial strategy, other witnesses, or whether to accept a plea deal. This rule draws a line between discussion of testimony as testimony (unprotected once the defendant is on the stand) and discussion of testimony that comes up incidentally while talking about other protected topics (still protected).
Who benefits
Trial judges who want to preserve the integrity of a defendant's sworn testimony during overnight recesses now have clear authority to issue narrowly tailored orders restricting testimony coaching. Prosecutors whose cases involve defendants who testify also benefit, as the ruling protects against midstream adjustments to testimony.
Who is affected
Criminal defendants who take the witness stand and whose testimony is interrupted by an overnight recess face a new, court-approved restriction: their attorneys may be ordered not to discuss, rehearse, or adjust their ongoing testimony during the break, even though all other attorney-client communication remains protected.
Practical impact
Trial judges across the country now have a clearer constitutional framework for issuing overnight conferral orders when a defendant's testimony is interrupted: they may prohibit attorneys from coaching, rehearsing, or adjusting the defendant's ongoing testimony, but must leave open all other attorney-client communication. Defense attorneys must be prepared to navigate this line — they can discuss strategy, plea options, other witnesses, and new evidence with their client overnight, but cannot work on shaping what the defendant will say when he returns to the stand. Defendants who believe a conferral order crossed the line from restricting testimony coaching into blocking protected discussion will need to show that specific protected topics were actually chilled or blocked.
Majority — Jackson
Joined by: Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett
The majority held that the line between its two prior rulings — Geders v. United States (1976) and Perry v. Leeke (1989) — is based on the content of the discussion, not just the length of the recess. The Court reasoned that when a defendant takes the witness stand, he takes on the burdens of any witness, including the burden that his testimony not be shaped by a lawyer's real-time feedback. Under Perry, a testifying defendant has no constitutional right to discuss his ongoing testimony with his lawyer, because that kind of discussion threatens the trial's truth-seeking function; what the defendant does retain is the right to discuss everything else — strategy, other witnesses, plea options — even if those conversations touch on testimony incidentally. The majority compared the rule to traditional witness sequestration (keeping witnesses separate so they cannot tailor their stories), saying a no-testimony-coaching order achieves the same goal within constitutional limits. The Court rejected the defendant's argument for a blanket rule allowing all overnight discussion, finding that lawyers are well-equipped to distinguish between coaching testimony and discussing other protected topics, and that a narrowly drawn order prohibiting only testimony management does not chill protected communication.
Dissent reasoning
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, agreed with the outcome but wrote separately because he believed the majority went further than necessary. In his view, the existing precedents in Geders and Perry already resolved this case without any need to announce a new rule: Geders said a total overnight ban is unconstitutional because it blocks discussion of matters beyond testimony, and Perry said defendants have no right to discuss ongoing testimony at all — so an order that only restricts testimony discussion plainly complies with both. Thomas argued that the majority's new framework — including its declaration that testimony discussion is protected when "incidental" to other topics, and its statement that conflicts between the Sixth Amendment and truth-seeking must be resolved in favor of counsel — goes beyond what the facts required and expands precedent without grounding in the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. He would have simply applied the existing cases and affirmed, without opining on hypothetical situations not before the Court.
Constitutional question
Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel prohibit a trial judge from ordering a defendant's attorneys not to discuss or "manage" the defendant's ongoing testimony during an overnight recess that interrupts the defendant's time on the witness stand?
Precedent changed
Extends and clarifies Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) and Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989), holding that the distinction between those two cases is one of content (protected vs. unprotected discussion), not merely the duration of the recess.