Docket 24-5438
Bowe v. United States
DecidedJan 9, 2026
6-3decision
Source: CourtListener.
Federal prisoners can challenge repeat postconviction claims that courts wrongly blocked under a state-prisoner-only rule
Impact4/10
What it does
The Court held that the rule automatically dismissing previously raised claims in second or successive postconviction filings (§2244(b)(1)) applies only to state prisoners, not to federal prisoners filing motions under §2255. The Court also held that the provision barring Supreme Court review of courts of appeals' certification decisions (§2244(b)(3)(E)) does not clearly apply to federal prisoners, so the Court retains jurisdiction to hear such cases. The case was sent back to the Eleventh Circuit to evaluate Bowe's request under the correct legal standard.
Who benefits
Federal prisoners seeking to file second or successive motions to challenge their convictions or sentences, particularly those whose earlier claims were dismissed solely because they had raised the same claim in a prior filing.
Who is affected
Federal courts of appeals, which must now evaluate repeated claims from federal prisoners under the more limited gatekeeping rules of §2255(h) rather than automatically dismissing them under §2244(b)(1)'s do-over bar.
Practical impact
Federal prisoners who previously had successive postconviction motions dismissed solely because they had raised the same claim before can now have those claims evaluated on their actual merits under §2255(h)'s gatekeeping standards — meaning they must still show newly discovered evidence of innocence or a new retroactive rule of constitutional law. For Michael Bowe specifically, the Eleventh Circuit must now reconsider whether his challenge to his §924(c) firearm conviction qualifies for authorization under the correct legal framework, potentially affecting his mandatory 10-year consecutive sentence.
Majority — Sotomayor
Joined by: Roberts, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Jackson
The majority held that §2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar expressly applies only to "habeas corpus application[s] under section 2254," which are filed exclusively by state prisoners — federal prisoners file "motions" under §2255, and Congress's use of different words in the same statute signals different meanings. The majority further reasoned that §2255(h)'s cross-reference to §2244 is narrow: it borrows only the procedures describing how a court of appeals panel certifies a successive filing, not the substantive content restrictions like the do-over bar. The Court also held that the certiorari bar in §2244(b)(3)(E) does not clearly apply to federal prisoners because Congress must speak plainly before stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction, and the cross-reference in §2255(h) is too ambiguous to meet that standard. The majority noted that AEDPA consistently treats state and federal prisoners differently — state prisoners face higher hurdles because of federalism concerns that do not apply when a federal court reviews a federal conviction. Finally, the majority emphasized that even without the do-over bar, federal prisoners' repeat claims still face the strict gatekeeping requirements of §2255(h) and a demanding statute of limitations, so very few claims will actually get through.
Dissent reasoning
The dissent argued that §2255(h) explicitly requires a federal prisoner's successive motion to be "certified as provided in section 2244," which incorporates all of §2244(b)(3)'s subparagraphs — including subparagraph (E)'s certiorari bar and, through §2244(b)(3)(C)'s reference to "the requirements of this subsection," the do-over bar in §2244(b)(1). The dissent contended that every court of appeals to consider the question has held that subparagraph (E) bars federal prisoners from seeking panel or en banc rehearing, and that the majority's position — that the certiorari bar applies to rehearing but not to certiorari petitions — is textually implausible since both are barred in a single sentence. The dissent further argued that the majority's "clear statement" rule requiring Congress to speak with special clarity before restricting the Court's certiorari jurisdiction has no grounding in the Constitution, prior precedent, or the statutory text, and amounts to a judge-made exception carved out solely for federal prisoners. On the merits, the dissent reasoned that §2244(b)(3)(C) requires any prisoner — state or federal — to make a prima facie showing that the filing satisfies "the requirements of this subsection," which includes §2244(b)(1)'s do-over bar, and that nothing in §2255(h) displaces that bar the way it displaces §2244(b)(2)'s new-claim requirements.
Constitutional question
Does the federal law barring "do-over" claims in second or successive habeas filings (28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(1)) apply to federal prisoners seeking to re-raise claims in successive motions under §2255, and does a separate provision strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear such cases?