Docket 24-482
Ellingburg
DecidedJan 20, 2026
9-0decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court rules mandatory crime victim restitution payments are criminal punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause
Impact3/10
What it does
The Court held that restitution payments ordered under the MVRA are criminal punishment, not a civil remedy, for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. This means the Clause's protections apply to MVRA restitution orders, so a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution under a law that did not exist when the crime was committed. The Eighth Circuit's contrary ruling was reversed and the case sent back for further proceedings.
Who benefits
People convicted of federal crimes who committed their offense before the MVRA took effect in April 1996 and who have been ordered to pay restitution under that law.
Who is affected
Federal prosecutors and courts that have used the MVRA to impose restitution obligations on defendants whose crimes predate the law's enactment; crime victims who receive restitution payments in such cases may see those obligations challenged.
Practical impact
On remand, the Eighth Circuit must now evaluate Ellingburg's Ex Post Facto Clause challenge on the merits, since the threshold question — whether MVRA restitution is criminal punishment — has been resolved in his favor. More broadly, federal defendants who were sentenced under the MVRA for crimes committed before April 24, 1996, now have a recognized legal basis to challenge their restitution obligations under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Majority — Kavanaugh
Joined by: Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
The majority held that MVRA restitution is plainly criminal punishment based on the statute's own text and structure. The Court pointed to several features: the MVRA labels restitution a "penalty" for a criminal "offense," it can only be imposed on a convicted criminal defendant at sentencing, it is ordered alongside other criminal punishments like imprisonment and fines, and it can even serve as the sole punishment for certain misdemeanors. The Court also noted that the MVRA is codified in Title 18 ("Crimes and Criminal Procedure"), that courts must follow criminal procedure rules when imposing it, and that the government — not the victim — is the party opposing the defendant at sentencing. The majority acknowledged that the MVRA also aims to compensate victims, but reasoned that a dual purpose (punish and compensate) does not strip the law of its criminal character, because the text and structure clearly show Congress intended to impose punishment. Finally, the Court distinguished a prior case involving sex-offender registration, which used civil procedures, noting that MVRA restitution has none of those civil characteristics.
Constitutional question
Does restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 count as criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, which bars the government from applying new laws retroactively to punish conduct that occurred before those laws existed?
Precedent changed
The ruling reverses the Eighth Circuit's prior precedent holding that MVRA restitution is not criminal punishment; it does not explicitly overrule any Supreme Court precedent, but it clarifies and extends prior Court statements in Manrique v. United States, Pasquantino v. United States, and Paroline v. United States, all of which had described MVRA restitution as criminal punishment.