Zuch

Majority — Barrett

Joined by: Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Jackson

The majority held that the word "determination" in §6330(d)(1) — the provision granting the Tax Court jurisdiction — refers only to the appeals officer's binary decision about whether a levy may proceed, not to every issue the officer considered along the way. The Court reasoned that the statute distinguishes between the "considerations" that inform a determination (such as the taxpayer's arguments about underlying liability) and the "determination" itself (the up-or-down levy decision), so the Tax Court's review is limited to that levy decision. The majority also pointed to §6330's overall structure and title — "Notice and opportunity for hearing before levy" — as evidence that the entire proceeding is focused on the levy, not on resolving freestanding tax disputes. The Court further noted that the default rule in tax law requires taxpayers to pay first and sue for a refund later, and it would be inconsistent with that rule to allow a §6330 appeal to become a vehicle for resolving tax liability questions that have no remaining connection to an active levy. Finally, the majority expressed doubt that the Tax Court has authority under §6330(e) to issue any relief beyond enjoining a levy, meaning it could not order refunds or issue binding declarations about tax liability once the levy was gone.

Dissent reasoning

In dissent, Justice Gorsuch argued that the statute's text does not limit the Tax Court's jurisdiction to levy decisions alone. He pointed out that §6330(d)(1) grants the Tax Court jurisdiction over the full "determination" — and that a "determination" under §6330(c)(3) expressly incorporates the taxpayer's challenges to her "unpaid tax" and "underlying tax liability," not just the levy question. He also noted that §6330(e)(1) allows the Tax Court to enjoin "any action" relating to the "unpaid tax or proposed levy," suggesting the court's remedial power extends beyond stopping a levy. The dissent further argued that the IRS's own prior guidance had acknowledged that a motion to dismiss is inappropriate in Tax Court when a taxpayer still contests the existence of her tax liability — meaning the government had reversed its own longstanding position to gain a litigation advantage. Most critically, Justice Gorsuch warned that today's ruling gives the IRS a roadmap to escape Tax Court accountability: it can pursue a levy, wait to see if the Tax Court is likely to rule against it, then drop the levy to moot the case — all while using other collection methods like retaining the taxpayer's later overpayments. He also highlighted a practical trap: taxpayers who rely on Tax Court proceedings may miss the separate administrative claim deadlines required before filing a refund suit, leaving them with no complete remedy at all, as happened to Ms. Zuch.