Docket 24-1056
Rico
DecidedMar 25, 2026
8-1decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court rules that absconding from supervised release does not automatically extend the supervision term
Impact4/10
What it does
The Court held that nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act allows a court to automatically extend a defendant's supervised release term simply because the defendant absconded. A supervised release term expires on the date a judge ordered, even if the defendant was missing during that time. Courts may still punish defendants for violations that occurred before the term expired, but they cannot treat conduct after the expiration date as a supervised release violation solely because the defendant had been hiding.
Who benefits
People on federal supervised release who abscond and are later recaptured after their court-ordered supervision term has expired — they cannot be held accountable for new criminal conduct as a supervised release violation if that conduct occurred after the expiration date.
Who is affected
Federal prosecutors and probation officers seeking to hold defendants accountable for crimes committed after a supervised release term's expiration date — they lose the ability to use abscondment as an automatic basis for extending the supervision period.
Practical impact
Federal defendants who abscond from supervised release and are recaptured after their court-ordered term has expired cannot have criminal conduct from after the expiration date treated as an independent supervised release violation — meaning that conduct cannot trigger the higher sentencing ranges associated with Grade A or B violations. However, courts on remand may still consider whether the sentence imposed was otherwise lawful, including whether the judge could have accounted for post-expiration conduct through other sentencing factors. Probation officers and prosecutors must act promptly — securing a warrant or summons before a supervision term expires — to preserve the court's authority to address violations after the term ends.
Majority — Gorsuch
Joined by: Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson
The majority held that the Sentencing Reform Act gives courts many specific tools to deal with defendants who violate supervised release — including revoking release, sending defendants back to prison, and adding new supervision terms — but automatically extending a supervision term is simply not one of those tools. The Court reasoned that the Act sets clear rules for when supervised release begins and ends, and the only true "tolling" rule in the Act (pausing the clock) applies when a defendant is imprisoned for 30 or more consecutive days — not when a defendant absconds. The majority also pointed to a separate provision allowing courts to act after a term expires, but only for violations that arose before expiration and only if a warrant or summons was issued during the term — showing Congress knew how to address this situation and drew careful limits. The Court rejected the government's argument that because supervision requires "observation and direction," a defendant who evades supervision should get no credit for that time, noting this created a logical contradiction: the government simultaneously argued Ms. Rico was both on and off supervised release during her absence. Finally, the majority said that if the government believes the existing rules leave gaps, the fix belongs with Congress, not the courts.
Dissent reasoning
In dissent, Justice Alito argued that the majority's analysis was unnecessarily complicated because the entire debate about whether the supervision term was "tolled" or extended was beside the point. The dissent reasoned that the sentencing judge was independently authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act to consider Ms. Rico's January 2022 drug offense when deciding how long to imprison her — not as a formal supervised release violation, but as one of the many factors courts are permitted to weigh under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), such as deterrence and public protection. The dissent noted that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, and a judge is always free to impose a sentence outside the recommended range when the guidelines do not fully capture the relevant circumstances — which is exactly what the judge did here by starting with a higher range and then varying downward. Justice Alito concluded that the judge made no legal error at all, and he would have affirmed the sentence.
Constitutional question
Does the Sentencing Reform Act authorize a rule that automatically extends a federal defendant's term of supervised release when the defendant absconds — that is, disappears and stops reporting to a probation officer?
Precedent changed
The ruling narrows the Ninth Circuit's longstanding "tolling" rule from United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1992), and rejects the Fourth Circuit's similar approach in United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2011), resolving a circuit split in favor of the First and Eleventh Circuits' contrary position.