Docket 23-825
Delligatti
DecidedMar 21, 2025
7-2decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court rules that intentionally causing death by inaction can count as a "crime of violence" under federal gun law
What it does
The Court held that deliberately causing injury or death — whether by a physical act or by a deliberate failure to act (an "omission") — always involves the "use of physical force" under § 924(c)(3)(A). This means that crimes defined by their result (such as murder) qualify as "crimes of violence" under federal law even when they can be committed by doing nothing, such as a parent who intentionally lets a child starve. As a result, defendants convicted of such offenses while carrying a firearm remain subject to the mandatory five-year sentencing add-on under § 924(c).
Who benefits
Federal prosecutors who charge defendants with firearm sentencing enhancements, because a broader range of predicate offenses — including result-based crimes like murder that can be committed by omission — now qualify as "crimes of violence" triggering the mandatory minimum.
Who is affected
People charged under state or federal murder or serious-injury statutes that allow conviction based on a failure to act (such as a parent who withholds food or medical care), who also face a § 924(c) firearm charge, and who argued that their underlying offense was not a "crime of violence."
Practical impact
Defendants charged under broadly written state murder or serious-injury statutes — including statutes that allow conviction for intentionally causing death by failing to fulfill a legal duty — cannot escape a § 924(c) firearm sentencing enhancement by arguing that their underlying offense can be committed without a physical act. Federal prosecutors may continue to stack the mandatory five-year consecutive sentence on top of other charges in cases involving firearms, even when the predicate violent offense is defined in result-based terms. Salvatore Delligatti's 25-year sentence, which included the § 924(c) enhancement, was affirmed.
Majority — Thomas
Joined by: Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett
The majority held that it is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm — whether by action or inaction — without using "physical force" within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A). The Court extended its earlier ruling in United States v. Castleman (2014), which held that knowingly causing bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force, reasoning that the same logic applies to § 924(c) even though that statute requires a higher degree of force than Castleman's statute did. The majority explained that force can be applied indirectly — for example, by poisoning someone's drink — and that deliberately doing nothing to prevent harm is just as much a "use" of force as a direct physical act; a mother who lets her child drink bleach, intending the child to die, is using the bleach's harmful properties as her instrument. The Court also reasoned that the phrase "against the person of another" simply requires that another person be the deliberate target of the force, which is always true when someone intentionally causes harm by omission. Finally, the majority noted that intentional murder — the clearest example of a "crime of violence" — has long been understood in American law to include killing by omission, so excluding omission-based crimes from the elements clause would produce an unreasonable result.
Dissent reasoning
The dissent argued that the plain text of § 924(c)(3)(A) cannot be stretched to cover crimes of omission, because each key word in the statute points toward active physical conduct. The word "use," the dissent noted, has long been understood by the Court itself to carry an "active meaning" — implying action and employment, not inertia or inaction. "Physical force" means a violent physical act applied to a body, not the passive allowance of pre-existing natural forces to cause harm. And the phrase "against the person of another" further signals that the statute targets volitional, directed conduct. The dissent also pointed to contextual evidence: a 1981 Senate report specifically noted that a dam operator who refuses to open floodgates would not commit a "crime of violence" because he did not "use physical force"; a large database of ordinary English usage showed that "use of physical force" virtually always refers to assertive physical contact; and Congress has explicitly mentioned omissions in dozens of other federal criminal statutes, suggesting its silence here was deliberate. The dissent further argued that the residual clause of § 924(c) — not the elements clause — was the natural home for omission-based offenses, and that expanding the elements clause to swallow omission crimes renders the residual clause pointless. Finally, the dissent contended that even if some ambiguity remained, the rule of lenity (the legal principle that ambiguous criminal laws should be read in favor of the defendant) would require ruling for the defendant.
Constitutional question
Does a person who knowingly or intentionally causes bodily injury or death by failing to act — rather than by taking a physical action — "use physical force" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), the federal law that adds a mandatory minimum sentence when a firearm is used during a "crime of violence"?
Precedent changed
The Court extended United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014), holding that its principle — that knowingly causing bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force — applies equally to § 924(c)(3)(A) and covers omission-based offenses, not just affirmative acts.