Docket 23-713
Bufkin
DecidedMar 5, 2025
7-2decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court rules veterans' "benefit of the doubt" claims reviewed only for clear factual error
What it does
The Court held that the Veterans Court's duty to "take due account" of the VA's benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not create a new or stricter standard of review — it simply requires the Veterans Court to apply the same standards it always uses: reviewing legal questions fresh (de novo) and factual questions only for clear error. Because deciding whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is primarily a factual task, the Veterans Court reviews those determinations only for clear error, meaning it will overturn the VA only if the VA made an obvious factual mistake.
Who benefits
The Department of Veterans Affairs, whose benefit-of-the-doubt determinations now receive deferential (clear-error) review rather than fresh, independent review by the Veterans Court.
Who is affected
Veterans who apply for service-connected disability benefits and dispute the VA's conclusion that the evidence in their case was not close enough to trigger the benefit-of-the-doubt rule — those veterans face a higher bar to overturn the VA's decision on appeal.
Practical impact
Veterans who challenge the VA's conclusion that their evidence was not in "approximate balance" will continue to face the deferential clear-error standard at the Veterans Court — meaning the Veterans Court will uphold the VA's call unless it was plainly wrong, not merely debatable. The ruling forecloses the argument that the Veterans Court must independently re-examine the entire record and reach its own fresh conclusion on whether evidence was close. Because the Federal Circuit already lacks jurisdiction to review most factual benefit-of-the-doubt determinations, the Veterans Court's deferential review is, for most veterans, the final word.
Majority — Thomas
Joined by: Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett
The majority held that the plain text of §7261(b)(1) — which says the Veterans Court must "take due account" of the VA's benefit-of-the-doubt rule "[i]n making the determinations under subsection (a)" — ties the review of benefit-of-the-doubt issues directly to the existing standards in subsection (a), not to some new, separate standard. The Court reasoned that deciding whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is at most a mixed question of law and fact, and that the right standard for such mixed questions depends on whether the work is primarily legal or primarily factual. Because the approximate-balance inquiry requires the VA to weigh individual pieces of evidence, assess credibility, and compare the overall strength of competing evidence — all deeply fact-bound tasks — the Court concluded it is predominantly factual and therefore reviewed only for clear error. The majority distinguished this from the probable-cause standard in criminal law, which courts review without deference, on two grounds: probable cause is a constitutional standard (carrying a presumption of fresh review), and it requires courts to develop a body of law about what a hypothetical reasonable officer would do — a legal-development function absent from the VA's case-by-case evidence-weighing. The Court also rejected the argument that its reading makes §7261(b)(1) meaningless, explaining that the provision at minimum makes explicit a duty that was previously implicit, and may additionally require the Veterans Court to raise benefit-of-the-doubt issues even when a veteran does not.
Dissent reasoning
The dissent argued that the majority's reading drains §7261(b)(1) of any real meaning, effectively treating Congress's 2002 amendment as a do-nothing "exclamation point" that changed nothing about how the Veterans Court reviews benefit-of-the-doubt decisions. Justice Jackson wrote that Congress enacted subsection (b)(1) specifically because veterans' groups complained that the Veterans Court was giving too much deference to the VA — so reading the provision to preserve that same deference contradicts Congress's evident purpose. The dissent also contended that the "approximate balance" determination is not a simple factual finding but a mixed question with a significant legal component: courts must develop standards over time for what "balanced" evidence looks like, just as they have done for probable cause and sufficiency of the evidence — both of which appellate courts review without deference despite being fact-intensive. The dissent further argued that the Veterans Court, as a specialized Article I tribunal with deep expertise in veterans' cases, is actually better positioned than the VA to make the approximate-balance call, and that nondeferential review would better protect veterans — many of whom are unrepresented — from having borderline claims wrongly denied. Finally, the dissent invoked the "veterans canon," the long-standing rule that ambiguous statutes governing veterans' benefits should be read in veterans' favor, as an additional reason to require more searching review.
Constitutional question
When the law requires the Veterans Court to "take due account" of the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule, what standard of review must the court apply — and is the VA's determination that evidence is in "approximate balance" a factual or legal question?