Docket 23-6573
Andrew
DecidedJan 21, 2025
7-2decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court revives death row inmate's claim that prejudicial evidence made her trial unfair
Impact4/10
What it does
The Court held that, at the time of Andrew's state appeal, it was already clearly established federal law that the Due Process Clause prohibits the introduction of evidence so prejudicial that it makes a criminal trial fundamentally unfair. Because the Tenth Circuit wrongly concluded that no such clearly established law existed, it never asked the next required question — whether Oklahoma's courts unreasonably applied that law to Andrew's case. The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's decision and sent the case back for that analysis to be done.
Who benefits
People convicted in state court who seek federal habeas review (a legal process allowing federal courts to examine whether a state conviction violated federal constitutional rights) and who argue that a flood of irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence made their trial fundamentally unfair.
Who is affected
State prosecutors and state courts whose evidentiary rulings may now face a clearer path to federal habeas review when defendants argue that improperly admitted prejudicial evidence rendered a trial fundamentally unfair.
Practical impact
On remand, the Tenth Circuit must now ask whether Oklahoma's courts unreasonably applied the due process fundamental-fairness principle to Andrew's case — separately for both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of her trial. More broadly, federal appeals courts reviewing state convictions under AEDPA can no longer dismiss due process claims about highly prejudicial evidence simply by saying no clearly established Supreme Court holding covers them; they must engage with the Payne principle as binding law.
Majority reasoning
The Court reasoned that when it relies on a legal principle to decide a case, that principle becomes a "holding" — binding law — for purposes of AEDPA, the federal law that governs when prisoners can seek federal review of state convictions. In Payne v. Tennessee (1991), the Court removed a blanket ban on victim-impact evidence in capital sentencing in part because it said the Due Process Clause already provided a backstop: defendants could still challenge evidence "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair." The Court held that this due process backstop was not a throwaway remark but was indispensable to the Payne decision, making it a binding holding. The Court further noted that this principle was not new even in 1991 — earlier cases had already recognized that prosecutors' prejudicial conduct could violate due process — so the law was well established by the time of Andrew's trial. Because the Tenth Circuit stopped at the threshold question and never asked whether Oklahoma's courts unreasonably applied this principle, the case must go back for that analysis.
Dissent reasoning
In dissent, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Gorsuch) argued that the Tenth Circuit correctly followed the Court's own repeated instructions not to define prior precedents too broadly when deciding what counts as "clearly established" law under AEDPA. The dissent contended that Payne's single sentence about due process was most naturally read as a passing remark — dicta (a legal term for statements in an opinion that are not necessary to the outcome) — because the Payne Court found the evidence in that case served legitimate purposes and never actually applied a due process test. The dissent also pointed to Estelle v. McGuire (1991), decided just months after Payne, in which the Court expressly left open whether admitting irrelevant evidence violates due process — a reservation the dissent argued would make no sense if Payne had already settled the question. Finally, the dissent argued that even if Payne's statement were treated as a holding, it was at minimum a debatable one, and AEDPA requires that the law be so clearly established that no fairminded jurist could disagree — a standard the dissent believed was not met here.
Constitutional question
Does clearly established federal law — as required by AEDPA for federal habeas relief — include the principle that the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial that it renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair? And did the Tenth Circuit err by refusing to consider that principle when reviewing Brenda Andrew's conviction?
Precedent changed
The ruling clarifies and extends the reach of Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), holding that its due process statement was a binding holding — not mere dicta — for AEDPA purposes. No prior precedent was overruled.