Docket 23-1270
Riley v. Bondi
DecidedJun 26, 2025
5-4decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court rules immigrants must file removal appeals within 30 days of original order, not later CAT ruling
Impact5/10
What it does
The Court held that the original administrative removal order — not a later Board of Immigration Appeals ruling on a Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim — is the "final order of removal" that starts the 30-day clock for filing a petition for judicial review. However, the Court also held that the 30-day deadline is not jurisdictional, meaning courts are not automatically stripped of power if the deadline is missed — the government must actually raise the timing objection, and if it chooses not to, the case can proceed.
Who benefits
Non-citizens who miss the 30-day filing deadline after a removal order, because the government may choose not to enforce the deadline and courts retain flexibility to hear late-filed petitions. Courts of appeals that previously had to dismiss late petitions automatically now have discretion when the government waives the timing objection.
Who is affected
Non-citizens subject to expedited removal proceedings who also seek protection under the Convention Against Torture, because they must now file a petition for judicial review within 30 days of their original removal order — potentially more than a year before the Board of Immigration Appeals rules on their CAT claim.
Practical impact
Non-citizens subject to expedited removal who wish to challenge a denial of CAT protection in court must now file a petition for judicial review within 30 days of their original removal order, even if their CAT proceedings before an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals are still ongoing. To avoid losing their right to judicial review, such individuals will need to file protective appeals immediately after receiving a removal order, then wait for the CAT proceedings to conclude before the court can fully hear their case. Because the 30-day deadline is not jurisdictional, the government retains the option to waive it — as it did in Riley's case — allowing courts to hear late petitions when the government does not object, which may soften the practical impact in some cases.
Majority — Alito
Joined by: Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, Barrett
The majority held that the original Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) issued by the Department of Homeland Security is the "final order of removal" under the statute, because it is the order that concludes the person is deportable and directs their removal. The Court reasoned that because non-citizens in expedited removal proceedings cannot appeal their removal order to an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals, the period to seek such review expires immediately upon the order's issuance, making it final at once. The majority relied on two prior decisions — Nasrallah v. Barr and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez — which established that CAT orders do not disturb or affect the validity of a removal order and that the finality of a removal order does not depend on the outcome of withholding-only proceedings. On the second question, the Court held that the 30-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional, because the statute's language directs what non-citizens must do to seek review but gives no directives to courts, does not reference jurisdiction, and is not placed in a part of the statute that concerns court authority. The Court noted that since its 2006 decision in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., it has consistently required a very clear signal from Congress before treating a deadline as jurisdictional, and no such signal exists here.
Dissent reasoning
The dissent argued that requiring Riley to file his appeal 16 months before the Board of Immigration Appeals issued the order he was challenging is logically incoherent — one cannot be required to appeal an order before it exists. Justice Sotomayor wrote that the statutory definition of finality does not clearly apply to expedited removal orders at all, because those orders are never reviewed by the Board, meaning there is no "period" for seeking Board review that could "expire" — a period that never begins cannot expire. The dissent contended that centuries of finality doctrine establish that when two orders must be appealed together in a single proceeding (as Congress directed for removal and CAT orders), they must also become final together, just as a criminal conviction does not become final for appeal purposes until a sentence is imposed. The dissent argued the majority's reliance on Guzman Chavez was misplaced, because that case addressed "administrative finality" for purposes of detention — an entirely different question than finality for purposes of appeal — and the Court in that case expressly declined to address the appellate finality question. The dissent warned that the ruling will force non-citizens facing expedited removal to file immediate protective appeals in every case just to preserve their right to later challenge a CAT denial, creating unnecessary burdens on courts, the government, and non-citizens alike — a result that benefits no one, as even the government agreed.
Constitutional question
When must a non-citizen subject to expedited removal file a petition for judicial review — within 30 days of the original removal order, or within 30 days of a later Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying protection under the Convention Against Torture? And is that 30-day deadline a hard limit on court power (jurisdictional) or a procedural rule that can be waived?
Precedent changed
The ruling extends and applies Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020), and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021), to the appellate filing deadline context. It also effectively narrows Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995), by clarifying that Stone's characterization of the filing deadline as "jurisdictional" was a loose use of the term that does not reflect current doctrine.