EO-14382
Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Iran
- Signed
- Feb 6, 2026
- Published
- Feb 11, 2026
Federal Register: 2026-02813
Source: Federal Register.
Tariffs on countries that trade with Iran to pressure Iranian government
Impact8/10
What it does
This order directs the Secretary of Commerce to identify any foreign country that purchases, imports, or acquires goods or services from Iran. Once identified, the Secretary of State may recommend — and the President may then impose — an additional tariff of up to 25% (used as an example rate) on goods imported into the United States from that country. The order builds on a national emergency first declared in 1995 regarding Iran and maintains the President's authority to modify or lift tariffs if circumstances change.
Who benefits
U.S. domestic manufacturers who compete with goods from countries that trade with Iran. Workers in industries that would face less foreign competition. U.S. national security and foreign policy agencies seeking additional leverage over Iran. Countries that already comply with existing Iran sanctions regimes, as they would face no new tariffs. The federal Treasury, which would collect additional tariff revenue if duties are imposed.
Who is affected
U.S. importers and retailers who source goods from countries that trade with Iran, facing higher input costs. U.S. consumers who may pay higher prices for affected imported goods. Small businesses reliant on global supply chains involving those countries. Foreign exporters — particularly in countries like China, India, Turkey, and others that maintain trade relationships with Iran — who could face significant new trade barriers. Third-country intermediaries whose indirect trade with Iran could trigger tariffs. U.S. industries dependent on imported components from affected countries.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that existing Iran sanctions have been undermined by third-country trade relationships that allow Iran to continue generating revenue, and that this order closes a critical gap by creating economic consequences for countries that enable Iran's economy. They contend that IEEPA grants the president broad statutory authority to regulate international commerce during a declared national emergency, and that the order's graduated, case-by-case process — requiring findings by Commerce and recommendations by State before any tariff is imposed — reflects a measured and deliberate use of that authority.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that using tariffs on uninvolved third countries as a foreign policy lever stretches IEEPA beyond its intended scope and may constitute a "major question" requiring explicit congressional authorization under the doctrine articulated in West Virginia v. EPA (2022). They contend that broad secondary tariffs risk triggering retaliatory trade measures against U.S. exporters, disrupting global supply chains, and raising costs for American consumers and businesses — harms that fall disproportionately on lower-income households — while the order's vague 25% example rate and wide executive discretion provide little predictability for trading partners or U.S. businesses.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The order cites the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq., and the National Emergencies Act (NEA), 50 U.S.C. §1601 et seq., as its primary statutory authority, both of which are congressional delegations of power to the executive to regulate international economic transactions during a declared national emergency. It also cites Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2483) and Section 301 of Title 3, U.S.C., which authorizes presidential delegation to executive officers. The underlying national emergency was originally declared under Article II foreign affairs powers and IEEPA in Executive Order 12957 (1995) and has been continuously renewed.