EO-14374
Establishing a Second Emergency Board To Investigate Disputes Between the Long Island Rail Road Company and Certain of Its Employees Represented by Certain Labor Organizations
- Signed
- Jan 14, 2026
- Published
- Jan 20, 2026
Federal Register: 2026-01061
Source: Federal Register.
Creates Second Emergency Board for Long Island Rail Road Labor Dispute
Impact3/10
What it does
This order establishes a three-member emergency board to investigate unresolved labor disputes between the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) and five unions representing its employees. The board will conduct a "final offer" arbitration process — each side submits its best offer, and the board selects the most reasonable one within 30 days. Until 60 days after the board submits its report, neither the railroad nor the unions may change working conditions without mutual agreement, effectively preventing a strike or lockout during that period.
Who benefits
LIRR commuters who depend on the railroad for daily travel and would be disrupted by a work stoppage. Businesses and employers in the New York metropolitan area that rely on LIRR service for their workforce. Union members who gain a structured, neutral process to have their final offer evaluated. The Long Island Rail Road as an institution, which avoids the operational and financial damage of a strike. Taxpayers and government entities that fund or subsidize LIRR operations.
Who is affected
Union members whose ability to strike — a core labor tool — is temporarily suspended during the board's review period. The five labor organizations (TCU, BLET, BRS, IAMAW, IBEW) whose negotiating leverage is constrained while the status quo is frozen. Workers who may feel a neutral board's "most reasonable offer" selection does not fully reflect their bargaining position. Parties who disagreed with the first emergency board's recommendations and now face a second round of the same process.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Railway Labor Act explicitly requires the president to establish a second emergency board upon request, making this order a mandatory and lawful exercise of statutory authority. They contend that the LIRR serves hundreds of thousands of commuters daily, and that a work stoppage would cause severe economic disruption to the New York metropolitan region, justifying the use of the RLA's dispute-resolution framework to protect the public interest while still giving both parties a fair hearing through the final-offer selection process.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the emergency board process, by temporarily barring strikes or lockouts, effectively strips unions of their most powerful bargaining tool and tilts the playing field toward management. They contend that repeated use of emergency boards can become a substitute for genuine collective bargaining, since both parties may hold back concessions in anticipation of a neutral board's intervention. Critics also note that if the board's selected offer does not satisfy the unions, underlying tensions remain unresolved and the dispute may resurface, making the process a delay rather than a true resolution.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
Authority is drawn from Section 9A of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §159a, which mandates that the president shall appoint a second emergency board upon request of an empowered party when a first board's recommendations are not accepted. This is a statutory delegation of authority to the executive branch, grounded in Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce (Article I, §8, cl. 3) and the president's Article II, §3 duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.