EO-14364
Addressing Security Risks From Price Fixing and Anti-Competitive Behavior in the Food Supply Chain
- Signed
- Dec 6, 2025
- Published
- Dec 10, 2025
Federal Register: 2025-22537
Source: Federal Register.
Creates Task Forces to Investigate Anti-Competitive Behavior in Food Supply
Impact6/10
What it does
This order directs the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to each establish a Food Supply Chain Security Task Force to investigate whether anti-competitive practices — including price fixing — exist in U.S. food-related industries such as meat processing, seeds, fertilizer, and farm equipment. It specifically instructs both agencies to examine whether foreign-controlled companies are driving up food costs or creating national security risks. The order requires both task forces to brief congressional leaders at 180 and 365 days, and authorizes the DOJ to pursue criminal proceedings, including grand jury investigations, if evidence of criminal collusion is found.
Who benefits
American consumers who pay grocery and food prices. Small and mid-size farmers who purchase seeds, fertilizer, and equipment and may face limited supplier competition. Independent meat processors and food distributors who compete against large consolidated players. Rural communities economically dependent on competitive agricultural markets. Domestic food companies that compete against foreign-controlled firms.
Who is affected
Large food processing and agribusiness corporations subject to investigation, including those with foreign ownership or investment. Foreign-controlled companies operating in U.S. food supply sectors. Seed, fertilizer, and farm equipment manufacturers facing potential antitrust scrutiny. Companies that have previously settled price-fixing civil suits and may face renewed regulatory attention. Legal and compliance departments at firms across the food supply chain.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that documented price-fixing settlements in the food industry — combined with high levels of consolidation in meat processing, seeds, and fertilizer — demonstrate a real need for coordinated federal enforcement. They contend the president has clear authority under Article II to direct executive agencies to prioritize enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and that scrutinizing foreign-controlled firms in critical supply chains is a legitimate national security function the executive branch is well-positioned to perform.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the order's emphasis on "foreign-controlled" companies risks politicizing antitrust enforcement, which is traditionally based on market conduct rather than ownership nationality. They contend that creating parallel task forces at both DOJ and FTC — agencies with overlapping jurisdiction — may produce duplicative or conflicting investigations, and that directing agencies toward predetermined conclusions about foreign ownership could undermine the independence and credibility of antitrust proceedings.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The order invokes the president's general Article II authority, including the Take Care Clause (Article II, §3), which empowers the president to direct executive agencies to enforce existing law. Statutory authority derives from the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §1 et seq.), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §12 et seq.), and the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. §41 et seq.), all of which delegate enforcement discretion to the DOJ and FTC. The national security framing may also draw on the president's Article II Commander-in-Chief and foreign-affairs powers.