EO-14361
Modifying the Scope of Tariffs on the Government of Brazil
- Signed
- Nov 20, 2025
- Published
- Nov 26, 2025
Federal Register: 2025-21417
Source: Federal Register.
Removes certain Brazilian agricultural imports from 40% tariff list
What it does
This order modifies a prior executive order (EO 14323) that had imposed a 40% tariff on certain imports from Brazil, by removing specific agricultural products from that tariff's coverage. The change is retroactive to November 13, 2025, meaning importers who already paid the 40% duty on those agricultural goods would be eligible for refunds. The Secretary of State is directed to continue monitoring the situation and report any developments that might warrant further presidential action.
Who benefits
U.S. importers of Brazilian agricultural products (e.g., coffee, soybeans, orange juice, sugar, and beef) who would no longer pay the 40% surcharge. U.S. food manufacturers and processors that rely on Brazilian agricultural inputs. Grocery retailers and, ultimately, consumers who may see lower prices on affected food products. Brazilian agricultural exporters and the Brazilian economy. U.S. companies with supply chains tied to Brazilian commodities. Customs brokers and trade attorneys processing retroactive duty refunds.
Who is affected
Domestic U.S. agricultural producers who compete with Brazilian imports and had benefited from the 40% tariff as a competitive buffer. U.S. farm lobbying groups that supported the original tariff as leverage in negotiations. Workers in U.S. agricultural sectors — such as soybean, sugar, and orange juice production — who may face renewed price competition from Brazilian goods. U.S. industries that had adjusted supply chains in anticipation of sustained tariffs on Brazilian agricultural products.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that selectively removing agricultural products from the tariff list is a measured and appropriate use of presidential trade authority, rewarding early progress in diplomatic negotiations with Brazil without fully abandoning leverage on other outstanding concerns. They contend that IEEPA expressly authorizes the president to adjust the scope of emergency economic measures as circumstances evolve, and that reducing costs on agricultural imports directly lowers input costs for U.S. food manufacturers and eases price pressures on American consumers.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that partially lifting tariffs mid-negotiation weakens U.S. leverage before Brazil has made binding commitments, potentially signaling that pressure can be relieved without concrete concessions. They contend that using IEEPA — a national security statute — to impose and then selectively adjust broad agricultural tariffs stretches the law beyond its intended scope, and that the major-questions doctrine, reinforced by West Virginia v. EPA (2022), may require clearer congressional authorization for tariff actions of this economic magnitude.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The order cites the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq., and the National Emergencies Act (NEA), 50 U.S.C. §1601 et seq., as the primary statutory delegations of authority, building on the national emergency declared in EO 14323. It also cites Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2483) and Section 301 of Title 3 (presidential delegation authority) as supplementary bases. This order does not independently invoke a new emergency but modifies the scope of an existing one, operating within the Article II foreign affairs and commander-in-chief powers as channeled through IEEPA.