EO-14352
Saving TikTok While Protecting National Security
- Signed
- Sep 25, 2025
- Published
- Sep 30, 2025
Federal Register: 2025-19139
Source: Federal Register.
Approves TikTok ownership restructure as satisfying national security law
Impact8/10
What it does
This order formally determines that a proposed restructuring of TikTok's U.S. operations — creating a new joint venture majority-owned by U.S. persons, with ByteDance holding less than 20% — qualifies as a "qualified divestiture" under the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act. It directs the Justice Department not to enforce that law against TikTok or related apps for 120 days to allow the deal to be finalized, and retroactively shields all parties from penalties dating back to January 19, 2025. It also amends a 2020 divestment order and directs CFIUS to enter a compliance agreement with certain investors.
Who benefits
The approximately 170 million U.S. TikTok users who can continue using the platform. U.S.-based content creators who earn income through TikTok. Small and mid-sized businesses that rely on TikTok for advertising and customer reach. App stores (e.g., Apple, Google) and internet hosting providers who were at legal risk under the Act. Investors in the new joint venture. Lemon8 and CapCut users, whose apps are also covered by the qualified divestiture determination.
Who is affected
National security advocates and lawmakers who sought a full, clean separation from ByteDance, since ByteDance retains up to a 20% stake. Competitors to TikTok in the short-video market who anticipated TikTok's removal. State attorneys general or private parties who may have sought to enforce the Act independently, as the order asserts exclusive federal enforcement authority. Americans concerned about data privacy, since the adequacy of the proposed safeguards is unverified by independent public review.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue the order fulfills the Act's own terms by using the presidential "qualified divestiture" determination mechanism that Congress explicitly wrote into the law. They contend the new structure — U.S. majority ownership, U.S.-based data storage, algorithm oversight by trusted security partners, and less than 20% ByteDance ownership — directly addresses the national security concerns that motivated the Act, while preserving a platform used by 170 million Americans and the livelihoods of countless creators and businesses.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue the order stretches the Act's "qualified divestiture" standard by allowing ByteDance to retain up to a 20% ownership stake and potentially ongoing algorithmic influence, which may not constitute a true severance of foreign adversary control. They contend that repeated enforcement delays since January 2025 — now totaling nearly a year — effectively nullify a law passed by Congress, raising separation-of-powers concerns about whether the executive can indefinitely defer a statutory mandate through a series of non-enforcement orders.
Constitutional basis
Executive orders rest on constitutional authority or statutory delegation. This summary describes the legal grounding cited or implied by the order.
The order's primary statutory authority is the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (P.L. 118-50, Div. H), which expressly delegates to the President the power to determine a "qualified divestiture" through an interagency process. It also invokes Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. §4565), which grants the President authority over foreign acquisitions that threaten national security, and the Commander-in-Chief and Take Care Clauses of Article II as background constitutional authority. A future president could reverse the qualified divestiture determination or reinstate enforcement, though retroactive liability waivers for past conduct would be harder to undo.