SRES-708-119
Resolution agreed to in Senate with amendments by Unanimous Consent.
What it does
This resolution would amend Rule XXXVII of the Standing Rules of the Senate to prohibit all Senators, officers, and Senate employees from entering into or offering to enter into any contract or transaction — including swaps — tied to the outcome of a specific event or contingency, which is the defining structure of a prediction market. The prohibition covers instruments classified as "excluded commodities" under the Commodity Exchange Act. It also expresses the sense of the Senate that the House, executive branch, and judicial branch should adopt similar restrictions. A narrow exception is preserved for standard insurance products where the holder has a lawful insurable interest.
Who benefits
The general public, who would gain assurance that Senators are not financially positioned to profit from legislative outcomes or inside knowledge of government actions. Market integrity advocates and good-government organizations. Prediction market platforms that currently face reputational risk from elected officials' participation. Constituents of Senators who may currently distrust their representatives' legislative motivations. Competitors or counterparties in prediction markets who may currently trade at an informational disadvantage against Senators.
Who is hurt
Current Senators, officers, and Senate employees who participate in prediction markets and would lose that avenue of financial activity. Prediction market platforms (such as Kalshi or Polymarket) that could lose high-profile participants or face broader regulatory pressure if similar restrictions spread to other branches. Senate staff who engage in prediction market trading as a personal financial activity unrelated to their official duties. Libertarian-leaning advocates who argue that restricting legal financial activity for public servants sets a problematic precedent for personal freedom.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that prediction markets are uniquely susceptible to insider trading by legislators, who routinely receive non-public information about pending legislation, regulatory actions, and geopolitical events that directly move market prices. They contend that a Senator who knows a bill will pass — or that a government action is imminent — can profit directly from that knowledge in a prediction market in ways that existing securities laws do not clearly cover, creating a gap that this rule closes. They further argue that the unanimous consent passage of this resolution demonstrates broad bipartisan recognition that the practice undermines public trust in the Senate as an institution.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a Senate-only internal rule is a narrow and unenforceable half-measure that leaves the executive branch, House, and judiciary entirely uncovered, allowing the same conflicts of interest to persist across most of the federal government. They contend that without an independent enforcement mechanism, criminal penalties, or mandatory disclosure requirements, the rule functions more as a symbolic gesture than a meaningful check — and that the "sense of the Senate" language urging other branches to follow suit carries no legal force whatsoever. They also argue that broad language covering any event-contingent contract could inadvertently sweep in legitimate financial instruments beyond the intended scope.