SRES-672-119
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text: CR S1787-1788)
Sponsored by Mike Lee (R-UT)
What it does
This resolution would express the formal sense of Congress that the United States should prioritize bilateral (one-on-one) security partnerships over multilateral (multi-country) security partnerships and institutions. As a "sense of Congress" resolution, it would not carry the force of law, create binding policy, or appropriate any funds — it would serve as a non-binding statement of congressional preference directed at the executive branch's foreign policy conduct.
Who benefits
Countries that have or seek direct bilateral security agreements with the United States, which may gain greater U.S. attention and resources. Defense contractors whose contracts are tied to bilateral rather than multilateral frameworks. U.S. policymakers who favor direct, customizable security arrangements. Allies who feel multilateral institutions dilute U.S. commitment to their specific security needs.
Who is hurt
Multilateral security institutions such as NATO and regional defense alliances that could face reduced U.S. political support. Smaller or less strategically prominent nations that rely on multilateral frameworks for security guarantees they could not obtain bilaterally. U.S. diplomatic and military personnel embedded in multilateral structures whose institutional roles could be deprioritized. International organizations and their staffs whose funding or influence could be reduced if the resolution shapes future appropriations debates.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that bilateral agreements allow the United States to tailor security commitments to specific national interests, set clearer terms, and hold individual partners directly accountable — advantages that multilateral institutions, with their consensus-based decision-making, often cannot provide. They contend that large multilateral bodies like NATO have faced persistent burden-sharing imbalances, with many members spending well below the agreed 2% of GDP on defense, and that bilateral frameworks give the U.S. greater leverage to demand reciprocal contributions.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that multilateral security institutions provide collective deterrence, intelligence-sharing, and interoperability that no series of bilateral agreements can replicate — pointing to NATO's Article 5 mutual defense commitment as a cornerstone of post-WWII stability that has never been triggered by an adversary. They contend that signaling a preference for bilateral arrangements could fracture alliance cohesion, embolden adversaries who benefit from divided Western responses, and undermine decades of U.S. diplomatic investment in institutions that amplify American influence beyond what bilateral deals alone could achieve.