SJRES-193-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
What it does
This joint resolution would direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities within or against Cuba that have not been authorized by a congressional declaration of war or a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). It would apply to all military components, including the Coast Guard, and explicitly covers blockade or quarantine operations. A carve-out preserves the President's authority to defend against an armed attack, an imminent armed attack, or to conduct lawful counternarcotics operations.
Who benefits
Members of Congress who argue their war-declaration authority under Article I has been bypassed. U.S. military service members who would be withdrawn from an unauthorized conflict zone, reducing their exposure to combat risk. Cuban civilians and government who would no longer face U.S. military hostilities. Diplomatic and legal advocates for strict separation of war powers. American taxpayers if military operations are curtailed and associated costs reduced.
Who is hurt
The executive branch, which would lose unilateral flexibility to conduct or sustain military operations against Cuba without congressional approval. U.S. national security and intelligence agencies that may rely on military assets in the region for operations beyond the bill's carve-outs. Allies or partners in the region who may depend on U.S. military posture near Cuba as a deterrent. Counternarcotics operations could be indirectly complicated if the line between authorized and unauthorized activities is disputed. Cuban dissidents or opposition groups who may view U.S. military pressure as leverage against the Cuban government.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution's Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) unambiguously grants Congress — not the President — the sole power to initiate hostilities against a foreign nation, and that any ongoing military operations against Cuba without a declaration of war or AUMF are unconstitutional. They contend the War Powers Resolution already requires troop withdrawal within 60-90 days absent congressional authorization, and this resolution reinforces that legal framework with a direct, Cuba-specific directive. They further argue that allowing the executive to conduct blockades or quarantines — acts historically treated as acts of war — without congressional approval sets a dangerous precedent for unchecked presidential war-making.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the President retains inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) to deploy forces and conduct operations short of full-scale war, and that this resolution improperly constrains that authority in a region of longstanding U.S. strategic interest. They contend the War Powers Resolution itself remains constitutionally contested — no president has ever acknowledged its binding force — and that a joint resolution cannot permanently redefine the boundary between executive and legislative war powers. They also argue that publicly mandating troop withdrawal could undermine deterrence, embolden the Cuban government, and signal weakness to adversaries monitoring U.S. resolve in the Western Hemisphere.
Constitutional context
The Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) gives Congress the power to declare war, while the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) gives the President authority over military operations once forces are deployed. The bill directly invokes this tension, which has never been fully resolved by the Supreme Court. The bill also cites the Prize Cases (1863), which acknowledged presidential authority to respond to attacks but noted the President cannot initiate or declare war — a principle the bill uses to frame any Cuba hostilities as requiring congressional authorization.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain direct authority to compel troop withdrawal; the President retains a check through the carve-out for self-defense and counternarcotics, and could veto the resolution, which would require a two-thirds override in both chambers to take effect.
Historical precedent
Congress has passed similar War Powers Resolution-based joint resolutions directing troop withdrawals from unauthorized conflicts, most notably S.J. Res. 54 (2019) directing removal of U.S. forces from the Yemen conflict, which passed both chambers but was vetoed by President Trump.