SJRES-193-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
What it does
This joint resolution would invoke the War Powers Resolution by directing the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities within or against Cuba that have not been explicitly authorized by Congress. As a joint resolution, it would require passage by both chambers and either presidential signature or a veto override to take effect. It does not declare war, authorize military action, or address diplomatic or economic relations with Cuba.
Who benefits
U.S. military personnel who would be withdrawn from any unauthorized hostilities, reducing their exposure to combat risk. Members of Congress who support reasserting legislative authority over war-making decisions. Cuban civilians who could be affected by U.S. military operations. Advocates of strict constitutional limits on presidential war powers. U.S. taxpayers who would no longer fund any such operations.
Who is hurt
The executive branch would lose flexibility to conduct or sustain military operations against Cuba without congressional approval. Any U.S. allies or partners whose security interests are tied to U.S. military posture in the region could be affected. Intelligence or special operations personnel whose activities might be classified as "hostilities" under the War Powers Resolution could face operational disruption. Cubans who may be relying on U.S. military pressure as leverage against the Cuban government could lose that support.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution's Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) vests the power to initiate hostilities in Congress, not the President, and that any military engagement with Cuba without congressional authorization is unconstitutional. They contend the War Powers Resolution was enacted precisely to prevent undeclared, open-ended military commitments, and that this resolution enforces that framework as intended — requiring democratic accountability before American service members are placed in harm's way.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the President's Commander-in-Chief authority (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) grants broad discretion to conduct military operations, particularly in response to fast-moving threats, and that requiring congressional approval in advance could dangerously constrain the executive's ability to protect national security interests. They also contend that the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution itself has never been definitively settled by the Supreme Court, meaning this resolution rests on a legally contested foundation.
Constitutional context
The core tension is between Congress's power to declare war (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) and the President's Commander-in-Chief authority (Art. II, §2, cl. 1). The War Powers Resolution (1973) requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing forces to hostilities and to withdraw them within 60–90 days absent congressional authorization. No Supreme Court ruling has definitively resolved whether the War Powers Resolution is constitutional, leaving the boundary between these two branches actively contested.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain direct authority to compel troop withdrawal; the President retains veto power over the resolution, and Congress would need a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override that veto.
Historical precedent
Congress has passed similar War Powers resolutions directing troop withdrawals in other contexts, most notably the 2019 joint resolutions directing removal of U.S. forces from the Yemen conflict, which passed both chambers but were vetoed by President Trump.