SCONRES-14-117
Pursuant to the provisions of H. Res. 601, S. Con. Res. 14 is considered passed House. (text: CR H4372-4384)
Sponsored by Bernard Sanders (I-VT)
What it does
This concurrent resolution sets the federal government's overall spending and revenue targets for FY2022 and projected levels for FY2023–FY2031. It directs multiple House and Senate committees to draft legislation that would increase the deficit by specified amounts, while also directing the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees to produce legislation reducing the deficit by at least $1 billion. Critically, it triggers the budget reconciliation process, which allows the Senate to pass certain spending and tax legislation with a simple majority rather than the 60 votes normally needed to overcome a filibuster.
Who benefits
Majority-party legislators who can use the reconciliation process to advance spending and tax legislation without needing bipartisan support in the Senate. Programs and populations targeted for increased funding under the reconciliation instructions — potentially including child care, pre-kindergarten, and infrastructure recipients — would benefit if follow-on legislation passes. Taxpayers earning under $400,000 annually are explicitly shielded from tax increases under the resolution's reserve fund provisions.
Who is hurt
Minority-party legislators and their constituents lose the procedural leverage that the filibuster normally provides, reducing their ability to block or significantly amend follow-on legislation. Taxpayers and future generations who would bear the cost of any deficit increases authorized by the reconciliation instructions could be negatively affected. Fiscal watchdog groups and deficit-reduction advocates argue that authorizing net deficit increases over the 10-year window works against long-term fiscal stability.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that this resolution is a necessary and legitimate use of the congressional budget process to address large unmet national needs. They contend that the reconciliation instructions allow Congress to act on priorities — such as child care, infrastructure, and social programs — that have broad public support but face procedural obstruction in the Senate. Supporters also point out that the resolution includes a deficit-reduction instruction of at least $1 billion and a reserve fund explicitly protecting people earning under $400,000 from tax increases, demonstrating fiscal responsibility alongside new spending. They argue that budget resolutions are a routine, constitutionally grounded tool for Congress to exercise its power of the purse, and that using reconciliation is a well-established, legal procedure used by both parties across decades.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that this resolution uses the reconciliation process to bypass the Senate's deliberative filibuster rules, allowing a narrow majority to enact sweeping fiscal changes without meaningful bipartisan input or debate. They contend that authorizing net deficit increases over the 10-year window adds to the national debt in ways that burden future taxpayers and risk long-term economic instability. Critics also argue that the broad and flexible reserve funds give committee chairs and leadership excessive discretion to adjust spending targets with little accountability, weakening the budget enforcement mechanisms the resolution claims to establish. They further assert that the scale of potential spending authorized through follow-on reconciliation legislation represents a significant and potentially permanent expansion of the federal government's role in areas traditionally left to states.
Constitutional context
Article I, Section 9 grants Congress the power of the purse — all spending and revenue measures must originate in or be approved by Congress. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 created the reconciliation process used here. The Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, Sec. 8) underpin Congress's authority to legislate on the economic matters that follow-on reconciliation bills would address. The Tenth Amendment is relevant to the extent that reconciliation legislation may direct federal spending into areas — such as child care and education — that states have traditionally regulated. West Virginia v. EPA (2022) and Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024) are relevant to any agency rules that might implement follow-on legislation, as courts now require clear congressional authorization for major regulatory actions and independently review agency legal interpretations.
Checks and balances
This resolution shifts procedural power toward the congressional majority by activating reconciliation, which limits the Senate minority's ability to filibuster follow-on legislation. The executive branch gains no direct authority from the resolution itself, but agencies implementing any resulting reconciliation legislation would operate under heightened post-Loper Bright and West Virginia v. EPA judicial scrutiny, requiring explicit statutory authorization for significant rules. Congress retains the power of the purse, but the resolution's flexible reserve funds give committee leadership discretion to adjust spending allocations, concentrating some intra-legislative power in committee chairs.
Historical precedent
Prior budget reconciliation resolutions include the FY2017 reconciliation resolution used to pass the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (2017) and the FY2021 reconciliation resolution used to pass the American Rescue Plan Act (2021). The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established the reconciliation process itself. The Byrd Rule (2 U.S.C. § 644) limits what provisions may be included in reconciliation bills.