S-3631-118
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 607.
Sponsored by John Cornyn (R-TX)
What it does
This bill would require the Department of the Interior to produce a global report on critical mineral and rare earth element (REE) resources — including who owns and controls them — within one year and every two years after that. It would also require Interior to create a process helping U.S. persons sell their stakes in foreign critical mineral operations to buyers that are not controlled by China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. Finally, it would direct Interior to develop a strategy for working with U.S. allies on advanced mining and processing technologies, and a method for sharing related intellectual property with those allies.
Who benefits
U.S. companies and individuals holding stakes in foreign critical mineral or REE operations who want to divest from those markets would benefit from a structured process to find approved buyers. U.S. defense and technology manufacturers that depend on critical minerals and REEs — used in electronics, electric vehicles, and military hardware — would benefit from a more secure and diversified supply chain. U.S. allied nations would benefit from access to shared American mining and processing technologies. The broader U.S. economy and national security apparatus would benefit from reduced dependence on adversary-controlled mineral supplies.
Who is hurt
Chinese, Russian, North Korean, and Iranian state-linked entities would be explicitly excluded from purchasing divested U.S.-held mining assets, potentially limiting their ability to expand control over global critical mineral supply chains. U.S. persons holding stakes in foreign mining operations may face a narrower pool of eligible buyers, which could reduce the sale price they receive when divesting. Domestic mining and processing industries in allied countries could face increased competition if U.S. technology is broadly shared. U.S. taxpayers would bear the administrative costs of the required reports, divestiture process, and technology-sharing strategy.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the United States is dangerously dependent on foreign adversaries — particularly China — for critical minerals and REEs that are essential to national defense, clean energy technology, and modern electronics. China currently controls a dominant share of global REE processing, giving it significant leverage over U.S. supply chains. This bill would give the government a clearer picture of the global mineral landscape, help U.S. investors exit adversary-controlled markets in an orderly way, and build allied partnerships to develop alternative sources and technologies. Proponents contend that without coordinated action, the U.S. risks supply disruptions that could cripple military readiness and key industries, and that this bill takes a measured, intelligence-driven approach to a genuine strategic vulnerability.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill creates new federal bureaucratic mandates — recurring global reports, a divestiture assistance process, and a technology-sharing strategy — without clear evidence these mechanisms will meaningfully reduce supply chain risk or be cost-effective. Critics may contend that restricting the pool of eligible buyers for divested assets to non-adversary entities could depress asset values and harm U.S. investors, effectively imposing a financial burden on private parties. Others may argue that sharing advanced mining and processing intellectual property with allied nations, even under licensing arrangements, risks technology leakage to adversaries through third parties. Some may also question whether Interior is the appropriate agency for these functions, given that trade, defense, and commerce agencies have more direct expertise in supply chain security and technology transfer.
Constitutional context
The bill rests primarily on Congress's Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, Sec. 8) to regulate foreign commerce and its broad power over national security and foreign affairs. The delegation of authority to Interior to develop strategies and processes implicates the Nondelegation Doctrine and, post-Loper Bright (2024), courts would independently review whether Interior's interpretations of its statutory mandate are correct rather than deferring to the agency. Under West Virginia v. EPA (2022), the Major Questions Doctrine could be invoked if Interior's resulting rules are deemed to have vast economic or political significance without clear congressional authorization. The technology-sharing provisions also touch on foreign affairs powers shared between the executive and legislative branches.
Checks and balances
The bill shifts authority to the executive branch — specifically the Department of the Interior — by directing it to produce binding reports, establish a divestiture assistance process, and develop technology-sharing strategies and methods. Congress retains oversight through the mandatory biennial reporting requirement, which creates a regular accountability mechanism. The bill does not appear to grant Interior rulemaking authority that would carry the force of law, limiting the scope of executive power gained. Post-Loper Bright, any agency interpretations of the bill's mandates would be subject to independent judicial review rather than judicial deference.
Historical precedent
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 similarly directed federal agencies to assess strategic resource vulnerabilities and develop allied technology-sharing frameworks. Executive Order 13817 (2017) and subsequent orders directed federal agencies to assess critical mineral supply chain risks, establishing a precedent for the reporting and strategy functions this bill would codify into statute.