S-2504-119
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Sponsored by Dan Sullivan (R-AK)
What it does
This bill would require three federal entities — the Executive Office of the President, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State — to use appropriated funds only to purchase cut flowers and cut greens grown in the United States or its territories, including areas under federally recognized tribal jurisdiction. The requirement would take effect one year after enactment. The bill would also require that when foreign governments or their registered agents gift non-U.S.-grown flowers to these agencies for display, the agency must clearly label the flowers' origin and simultaneously procure a domestically grown counterpart to display alongside them.
Who benefits
U.S. domestic flower and foliage growers, particularly those in major production states such as California, Florida, and Hawaii, who would gain a guaranteed federal procurement market. Domestic floral wholesalers, distributors, and florists who supply federal contracts. Tribal-land growers, who are explicitly included in the definition of qualifying areas. Workers employed in domestic floriculture operations. Advocates for domestic agricultural supply chain security more broadly.
Who is hurt
Foreign flower exporters — particularly those in Colombia and Ecuador, which together supply roughly 80% of cut flowers sold in the U.S. — who would lose access to federal procurement contracts. U.S. importers and brokers who handle foreign-grown flowers and supply federal agencies. Federal agencies that may face higher procurement costs, since imported flowers are often less expensive than domestically grown alternatives. Taxpayers who may indirectly bear any cost differential. Florists and vendors currently holding federal supply contracts based on imported inventory.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the federal government should not spend taxpayer dollars on foreign agricultural products when a domestic industry exists and is capable of supplying the same goods. They contend that concentrating flower procurement in agencies with high diplomatic and symbolic visibility — the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department — sends a meaningful signal about American agricultural production, and that including tribal lands in the qualifying area expands economic opportunity for Native American growers. They further argue the one-year phase-in gives vendors adequate time to adjust supply chains.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that restricting procurement to domestic sources for a decorative agricultural product raises costs without a clear national security or economic rationale proportionate to the restriction. They contend that Colombia and Ecuador — the dominant U.S. flower suppliers — are close trade partners, and that preferential procurement rules could complicate broader trade relationships or invite reciprocal restrictions on U.S. exports. They also argue that the domestic floriculture industry may lack the scale and variety to reliably meet the full decorative needs of the covered agencies year-round, potentially creating supply gaps or quality limitations.