S-2144-119
Held at the desk.
Sponsored by Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
What it does
This bill would prohibit data brokers from buying or selling the personal information of Members of Congress, their immediate family members, former members, and designated congressional staff. It would also require government agencies and private websites to remove such personal information — including home addresses, phone numbers, vehicle identifiers, children's school information, and geolocation data — within 72 hours of receiving a written request. At-risk individuals could file requests themselves, through an agent, or through the congressional Sergeants at Arms acting on their behalf.
Who benefits
Current and former Members of Congress and their immediate family members (spouses, parents, siblings, children, and household members). Designated Senate and House employees. Children of covered individuals, whose school locations and daily schedules would be shielded. Congressional staff who face threats or harassment. Indirectly, the legislative branch as an institution, if reduced targeting of members improves its functioning.
Who is hurt
Data brokers whose business model depends on selling personal information, who would face an outright prohibition on trading covered individuals' data. Journalists and researchers who may find certain public records harder to access, though the bill includes press exemptions. Members of the public and watchdog organizations seeking to track the whereabouts or personal connections of elected officials, even for legitimate accountability purposes. State and local governments that maintain public records systems and would need to build compliance infrastructure. Smaller websites and online platforms that may lack resources to implement 72-hour removal processes. Competing candidates or political opponents who might otherwise use public records for opposition research.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that threats and physical attacks against Members of Congress and their families have increased sharply in recent years — the Capitol Police reported a 400% increase in threats against members between 2016 and 2021 — and that commercially available personal data directly enables targeted harassment and violence. They contend that data brokers aggregate home addresses, daily routes, and children's school information into profiles that bad actors can purchase for a small fee, creating a specific and documented security risk that existing law does not address. They further argue that the bill's press exemptions and public-record carve-outs preserve accountability while closing the most dangerous avenues of exposure.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that elected officials are public figures who have voluntarily entered public life, and that restricting access to their personal information — even with press exemptions — sets a precedent for shielding powerful people from legitimate public scrutiny. They contend that the bill's broad definition of "at-risk individual," which extends to household members and designated staff, could sweep in a large class of people who have not been elected and whose privacy interests must be weighed against the public's right to know. Critics also argue that the bill creates a two-tiered privacy system where Congress grants itself protections unavailable to judges, executives, law enforcement officers, and other public servants who face comparable or greater threats.