S-1273-116
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 206.
Sponsored by John Kennedy (R-LA)
What it does
The CASE Act of 2019 would create a Copyright Claims Board (CCB) inside the U.S. Copyright Office to resolve small copyright disputes outside of federal court. Monetary awards would be capped at $30,000 per case. Participation would be voluntary — defendants could opt out and have the dispute heard in a federal court instead, but if both parties agree to use the board, they would give up their right to a jury trial and to relitigate the matter in court.
Who benefits
Independent creators — photographers, illustrators, writers, musicians, and other individual copyright holders — who currently cannot afford federal court litigation to enforce small-scale infringement claims. Small businesses and self-employed artists whose works are copied online without permission would gain a lower-cost, faster path to compensation. Defendants in minor disputes would also benefit from a streamlined, less expensive process compared to full federal litigation.
Who is hurt
Individual internet users, bloggers, and small online publishers who share or repost content could face copyright claims without the procedural protections of federal court. Critics argue that unsophisticated defendants may not understand or exercise the opt-out right, effectively waiving jury trial rights by default. Large platforms and aggregators that host user-generated content could face increased claim volume. Defendants who miss the opt-out window would be bound by board decisions with very limited grounds for appeal.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the current copyright system is broken for everyday creators: filing a federal lawsuit costs tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees, making it economically irrational to pursue legitimate small-scale infringement claims. The CCB would give photographers, illustrators, and independent musicians a realistic, affordable way to protect their work — the same legal right that large corporations already exercise routinely. The $30,000 damages cap, voluntary participation, and opt-out procedure protect defendants from abuse, while the board's streamlined rules reduce burdens on both parties. Without a small-claims option, the practical effect is that infringers face no consequences for stealing the work of individual creators who cannot afford to sue.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the opt-out mechanism places an unfair burden on ordinary internet users, who may receive a legal notice, fail to understand its significance, miss the 60-day opt-out window, and unknowingly waive their constitutional right to a jury trial. The $30,000 cap per claim — and the possibility of multiple simultaneous claims — could expose individuals to significant financial liability through a process with fewer procedural safeguards than federal court. Critics also contend that the board, housed within the Copyright Office (an executive agency), raises separation-of-powers concerns because it would exercise adjudicative functions traditionally reserved for Article III courts. The limited grounds for federal court review could leave defendants with no meaningful recourse against erroneous decisions.
Constitutional context
The bill implicates Article III of the Constitution, which vests judicial power in federal courts with life-tenured judges. Creating an adjudicative body inside an executive agency raises questions about whether Congress may assign copyright dispute resolution — a private-rights matter — to a non-Article III tribunal. The Supreme Court's decision in Stern v. Marshall (2011) limits Congress's ability to assign final adjudicative authority over private rights to non-Article III bodies. The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil suits is waived by consent under the bill's opt-out structure, raising questions about whether that waiver is sufficiently knowing and voluntary. The Copyright Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 8) grants Congress authority to protect authors' rights, providing the primary legislative basis. Post-Loper Bright (2024), courts would independently review any Copyright Office rulemaking implementing the board's procedures.
Checks and balances
The bill shifts adjudicative authority from the judicial branch (Article III federal courts) to an executive-branch body (the Copyright Claims Board within the Copyright Office, which is part of the Library of Congress — itself a legislative branch entity). This creates an unusual structural arrangement: a quasi-judicial tribunal housed in the legislative branch exercising functions that resemble those of Article III courts. Congress gains influence over copyright dispute resolution by embedding the board in an agency it oversees, while federal courts lose jurisdiction over cases where both parties consent to board proceedings.
Historical precedent
The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), also housed within the Library of Congress, provides a partial precedent for legislative-branch adjudication of copyright-related disputes. The Small Claims Court system at the state level offers a structural analogy for capped, simplified civil dispute resolution. Congress has previously created non-Article III tribunals in specialized areas, including the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims, though their constitutional foundations differ.