HR-9115-119
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Clay Higgins (R-LA)
What it does
This bill would extend the expiration date of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) — which authorizes warrantless collection of foreign intelligence communications — from June 12, 2026 to June 12, 2029. It would also add new restrictions on how the FBI may access and query communications of U.S. persons collected under Section 702, require attorney approval for FBI queries involving U.S. persons, impose new criminal penalties on government employees who misuse surveillance data, mandate quarterly FISA Court oversight reports to Congress, direct a Government Accountability Office audit of Section 702 targeting procedures, and permanently prohibit the Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) until December 31, 2031.
Who benefits
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies that rely on Section 702 for foreign intelligence collection would retain their current authorities for three more years. Americans concerned about government surveillance of U.S. persons would benefit from the new warrant requirements, attorney-approval rules, and FISA Court oversight provisions. Congress gains enhanced oversight through quarterly court reports and the GAO audit. Whistleblowers and civil liberties advocates benefit from stronger criminal penalties deterring unauthorized queries. Americans who oppose a government-issued digital currency benefit from the CBDC prohibition. Financial technology companies and private cryptocurrency issuers face reduced competition from a potential Federal Reserve digital product.
Who is hurt
Civil liberties organizations and privacy advocates who oppose any extension of Section 702 — arguing the program itself is the problem — would see the authority continue for three more years. U.S. persons whose communications are incidentally collected under Section 702 remain subject to the program, even with new restrictions. Intelligence community personnel face new criminal liability for query violations, potentially creating a chilling effect on legitimate national security work. The Federal Reserve and proponents of a U.S. CBDC would be blocked from developing or issuing one through 2031. Countries or institutions that may benefit from a U.S. digital dollar in international finance would see that option foreclosed. Smaller financial institutions that might benefit from CBDC infrastructure also lose a potential tool.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Section 702 is one of the most valuable foreign intelligence tools the U.S. government possesses, used to monitor foreign terrorists, state adversaries, and cyber threats — and that a lapse would create dangerous gaps in national security coverage. They contend the bill meaningfully addresses documented abuses: the FBI conducted over 278,000 unauthorized U.S. person queries in a single year (per the FISA Court's 2022 findings), and the new warrant requirements, attorney-approval mandates, and criminal penalties directly target that misconduct. On the CBDC provision, supporters argue that a government-issued digital currency would give the Federal Reserve unprecedented surveillance and control over individual financial transactions, and that blocking it protects financial privacy and preserves the role of private-sector innovation.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that extending Section 702 for three more years — even with added restrictions — perpetuates a program that has repeatedly been used to search the communications of millions of Americans without a warrant, in potential violation of the Fourth Amendment. They contend the new "probable cause" restrictions contain significant loopholes, including broad savings clauses and defenses for supervisory approval, that may allow the same abusive query patterns to continue. On the CBDC provision, critics argue it is unrelated to foreign intelligence surveillance and was inserted into a defense-category bill without proper committee consideration; they also contend that blocking CBDC development forecloses a tool that could modernize payment infrastructure, improve financial inclusion for unbanked Americans, and strengthen the dollar's global role.
Constitutional context
Section 702 surveillance implicates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches, and the bill's new warrant requirement for U.S. person queries directly responds to that tension. Under Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952), executive surveillance programs require congressional authorization to operate at their strongest legal footing — this bill provides and renews that authorization. The CBDC prohibition raises questions about Congress's authority to restrict Federal Reserve operations, which is grounded in the Commerce Clause and Congress's enumerated power to coin money (Art. I, §8, cl. 5).
Checks and balances
The executive branch (FBI, intelligence community) retains surveillance authority but faces new constraints: the FISA Court gains mandatory quarterly review and reporting duties, Congress gains direct oversight through those reports and the GAO audit, and individual government employees face criminal liability for misuse — shifting meaningful checks toward both the judiciary and the legislature.
Historical precedent
Section 702 was originally enacted in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and has been reauthorized multiple times, most recently by the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (2024), which added the first statutory restrictions on U.S. person queries that this bill would further tighten.