HR-8901-119
Referred to the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
Sponsored by John Moolenaar (R-MI)
What it does
This bill would prohibit any individual or organization receiving federal research funding — through grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, or other federal awards — from collaborating with entities or individuals on U.S. government restricted lists. It would direct the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to issue government-wide compliance guidance. Agency heads could grant case-by-case waivers for national security, scientific, or public health purposes, with required congressional notification within 30 days.
Who benefits
U.S. national security and intelligence agencies seeking to limit foreign adversary access to federally funded research. Domestic technology and defense companies that compete with restricted foreign entities. Universities and research institutions that already have compliance programs and would benefit from standardized rules. Policymakers seeking a unified framework across agencies. Taxpayers whose funded research would be shielded from potential foreign exploitation.
Who is hurt
Researchers and academics who currently collaborate with scientists at institutions on restricted lists — including many Chinese universities — who would need to end or restructure those relationships. International graduate students and visiting scholars affiliated with restricted entities who could lose access to federally funded labs or projects. U.S. universities that rely on international partnerships for scientific output and funding leverage. Smaller research institutions with limited compliance infrastructure that would bear new administrative costs. Scientific fields — such as climate science, public health, and basic physics — where international collaboration is standard practice and where restricted-entity affiliations may be incidental rather than security-relevant.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that adversarial foreign governments — particularly China — have systematically exploited open U.S. research environments to acquire sensitive technologies, citing the FBI and DOJ's documented prosecutions under the China Initiative and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center's warnings about research theft. They contend that the bill closes a concrete gap: federal agencies currently apply inconsistent standards, allowing restricted entities to access taxpayer-funded research through collaborative back channels. By anchoring restrictions to existing, well-established government lists rather than creating new designations, the bill provides clear, administrable rules while preserving agency flexibility through the waiver process.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's broad definition of "research collaboration" — covering co-authorship, data sharing, visiting scholar appointments, and student supervision — would sweep in routine scientific exchanges that pose no realistic security risk, effectively isolating U.S. researchers from the global scientific community. They contend that the restricted entity lists were designed for export control and sanctions enforcement, not academic research, and that applying them wholesale to science funding could exclude legitimate partners at major foreign universities based on tangential affiliations. Critics also point to evidence that international scientific collaboration strengthens U.S. competitiveness and that overly broad restrictions may accelerate the departure of foreign-born researchers from U.S. institutions.
Constitutional context
Congress has broad authority to attach conditions to federal spending under the Spending Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 1), and courts have generally upheld such conditions when they are unambiguous and related to the funded program. The bill's delegation to OSTP to issue "government-wide implementation guidance" may face heightened judicial scrutiny post-Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024), as courts will independently assess whether the statutory language provides sufficient direction rather than deferring to agency interpretation.
Checks and balances
The Executive Branch — specifically OSTP and individual agency heads — gains significant implementation and waiver authority; Congress retains a check through mandatory 30-day written notification of all waivers, and courts retain review authority over agency guidance under the post-Loper Bright independent judgment standard.
Historical precedent
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 and the SECURE Campus Act (enacted as part of the FY2021 NDAA) imposed similar restrictions on federally funded researchers' participation in foreign talent recruitment programs, establishing a partial precedent for conditioning research awards on foreign affiliation disclosures and prohibitions.