HR-8744-119
Referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, and Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Sponsored by Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)
What it does
The TREE Act would prohibit the import into the United States, and the sale in interstate commerce, of goods produced from or linked to deforestation or forest degradation on or after December 31, 2020. Starting January 1, 2029, importers of covered commodities — cattle, cocoa, palm oil, rubber, soy, and wood — would be required to submit due diligence statements to Customs and Border Protection certifying their products are deforestation-free. The U.S. Trade Representative would categorize every country by deforestation risk level (I, II, or III), triggering tiered inspection rates and penalties for violations, including fines up to 4% of a violator's U.S. revenue, goods confiscation, and temporary import bans.
Who benefits
Domestic producers of cattle, soy, palm oil, cocoa, rubber, and wood who already comply with U.S. environmental standards and currently compete against lower-cost imports from deforested land. Environmental and conservation organizations. Indigenous communities and local populations in forested regions whose land rights may be strengthened by foreign country compliance requirements. Renewable and sustainable forestry businesses. Developing countries categorized as high-risk (Level I) that would receive preferential access to U.S. financial assistance for forest management. Consumers who prefer deforestation-free products. Customs and Border Protection, which would receive expanded enforcement authority and resources.
Who is hurt
U.S. importers and retailers of beef, chocolate, rubber, soy-based products, and wood products who source from regions with high deforestation rates, facing new compliance costs and potential supply chain disruptions. Small and mid-size importers with fewer resources to build supply chain traceability systems. Foreign agricultural producers — particularly in Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, and other major commodity-exporting nations — whose goods may be blocked or face higher inspection rates. U.S. consumers who may face higher prices for products containing palm oil, soy, cocoa, rubber, or beef. Food and consumer goods manufacturers reliant on global commodity supply chains. Freight and logistics companies handling affected commodities. Countries categorized as Level I or II risk, which face trade friction and diplomatic consequences.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that tropical deforestation accounts for roughly 10% of global greenhouse gas emissions annually, and that U.S. consumer demand for commodities like beef, soy, and palm oil is a documented driver of forest loss in the Amazon, Congo Basin, and Southeast Asia. They contend that without a legal standard, U.S. markets effectively subsidize deforestation by allowing lower-cost, environmentally destructive goods to undercut responsible producers. They also note that the European Union enacted a nearly identical Deforestation Regulation in 2023, meaning U.S. companies already exporting to Europe face comparable requirements — making alignment with the EU standard a matter of competitive consistency rather than novel burden.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill imposes sweeping supply chain documentation requirements on thousands of U.S. businesses, with compliance costs falling disproportionately on small importers who lack the resources to verify geolocation coordinates and forest status across complex global supply chains. They contend that the bill's country risk categorization system — which gives the U.S. Trade Representative broad discretionary authority to effectively restrict trade with entire nations — could be used as a non-tariff trade barrier in ways that violate World Trade Organization commitments and damage diplomatic relationships with key trading partners. They further argue that directing half of all collected penalties to foreign aid, bypassing the normal appropriations process, raises separation of powers concerns about congressional control over federal spending.
Constitutional context
Congress's authority to regulate imports and interstate commerce rests on the Foreign Commerce Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 3), which grants broad power to regulate trade with foreign nations. The bill's delegation of country risk categorization and penalty authority to the U.S. Trade Representative raises questions under post-Loper Bright (2024) standards, where courts now independently assess whether statutory delegations are sufficiently clear — though the bill provides more explicit criteria than many prior trade statutes. The provision directing penalty revenues to foreign assistance without a separate appropriation may also implicate Congress's exclusive power of the purse under Art. I, §9.
Checks and balances
Congress would establish the prohibition and penalty framework; the Executive Branch — through the USTR, CBP, Secretary of State, and Secretary of the Interior — would gain significant new authority to categorize countries, set inspection rates, impose fines, and direct penalty revenues to foreign aid, with judicial review available for enforcement actions but no explicit congressional oversight mechanism built into the bill.
Historical precedent
The Lacey Act (1900, amended 2008) similarly prohibits the import and interstate sale of plants and plant products — including wood — harvested in violation of foreign laws, and has been used to prosecute timber importers; the TREE Act extends this logic to a broader set of commodities with an explicit deforestation standard.