HR-8040-119
Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Sponsored by Sheri Biggs (R-SC)
What it does
The bill's full text was not provided beyond its title, but based on its name — the "No Mercy for Terrorists Act of 2026" — it would likely eliminate or restrict parole, early release, or sentence reduction eligibility for individuals convicted of terrorism-related federal offenses. It would likely require that such individuals serve their full sentences without the possibility of early release. The specific offenses covered, sentencing mechanisms affected, and any exceptions are not determinable from the available text.
Who benefits
Victims of terrorism and their families, who may favor mandatory full-term sentences as a matter of justice and public safety. Federal prosecutors, who would gain stronger leverage in plea negotiations. Communities and the general public, to the extent that longer incarceration reduces recidivism risk. Law enforcement agencies that advocate for stricter terrorism sentencing.
Who is hurt
Individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses who would lose eligibility for early release, including those who may have cooperated with authorities, demonstrated rehabilitation, or were convicted of lesser terrorism-adjacent offenses. Defense attorneys and civil liberties organizations that advocate for individualized sentencing. Federal Bureau of Prisons, which may face increased long-term incarceration costs. Taxpayers who bear the cost of extended federal incarceration.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that terrorism is a uniquely severe crime targeting civilians and democratic institutions, and that mandatory full sentences send a necessary deterrent signal while ensuring dangerous individuals cannot be released prematurely. They contend that parole boards are ill-equipped to assess the ideological motivations underlying terrorism convictions, and that the public safety risk of early release — as seen in cases where released terrorism convicts reoffended — justifies removing discretionary release entirely.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that eliminating individualized release review removes a critical check on disproportionate sentences and strips judges and parole boards of the ability to account for rehabilitation, cooperation with authorities, or unjust convictions. They contend that mandatory sentencing schemes have historically been applied unevenly across racial and ideological lines, and that the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle — as applied in cases like Miller v. Alabama — requires that sentencing retain some individualized flexibility rather than imposing blanket restrictions.
Constitutional context
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and the Supreme Court has held that mandatory sentencing schemes with no individualized review can raise proportionality concerns, as in Miller v. Alabama (2012). The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause may also be implicated if the bill retroactively removes release eligibility from individuals already sentenced under prior rules.
Checks and balances
The executive branch (Bureau of Prisons and DOJ) would gain more rigid enforcement authority over terrorism sentences, while the judicial branch and parole system would lose discretionary oversight; Congress retains authority to define the scope of covered offenses and any exceptions.
Historical precedent
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) significantly increased mandatory minimum sentences for terrorism offenses and restricted post-conviction review, and has faced ongoing constitutional challenges regarding proportionality and habeas corpus access.