HR-7828-119
Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
Sponsored by Adelita Grijalva (D-AZ)
What it does
This bill would make several changes to the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. It would raise the income and asset limits that determine eligibility, increase monthly benefit amounts to match the federal poverty level, eliminate the "marriage penalty" (which currently reduces benefits for married couples), exclude retirement accounts and in-kind support from eligibility calculations, and extend SSI coverage to residents of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa for the first time. Most changes would take effect one year after enactment and would be adjusted annually for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for Elderly Consumers (CPI-E).
Who benefits
Current SSI recipients (approximately 7.5 million people) who would receive higher monthly benefits. Low-income elderly and disabled individuals who are currently ineligible due to asset or income limits that have not been updated in decades. Married SSI couples who currently receive a reduced combined benefit. Residents of Puerto Rico (~3.2 million), U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa who are currently excluded from SSI entirely. Native American and Alaska Native individuals who receive tribal general welfare payments, which would no longer count against eligibility. Individuals with retirement savings accounts who currently must spend them down to qualify. Recipients of large past-due benefit payments, who would no longer be required to hold them in restricted dedicated accounts.
Who is hurt
Federal taxpayers who would bear the cost of significantly expanded program spending. State governments that administer supplementary SSI payments may face increased administrative complexity. Territorial governments in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa, which currently administer their own separate assistance programs, may face administrative transitions or funding shifts. Workers and employers who fund Social Security through payroll taxes, as the program's fiscal demands increase. Medicaid programs in territories, which may face increased coordination requirements. Individuals who transferred assets below fair market value to qualify for SSI would no longer face an SSI penalty, though the bill preserves the Medicaid look-back rule — meaning Medicaid eligibility could still be affected.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that SSI's core eligibility thresholds — including a $2,000 individual asset limit — have not been meaningfully updated since 1989, causing the program to exclude many of the poorest elderly and disabled Americans through inflation-eroded rules. They contend that current benefit levels, which fall below the federal poverty line, leave recipients in poverty by design, and that tying benefits to the poverty guideline corrects a structural failure. Supporters also argue that excluding 3.5 million U.S. citizens and nationals in the territories from a federal program available to all 50 states and D.C. creates a two-tiered system of citizenship that is both inequitable and constitutionally questionable.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's combined changes — raising asset limits tenfold, extending SSI to four territories, and indexing benefits to the poverty line — would produce a very large and potentially unbudgeted increase in federal spending at a time of significant fiscal pressure. They contend that extending SSI to the territories without a phased or capped approach could strain federal finances and overwhelm territorial administrative infrastructure that has never operated the program. Opponents also argue that eliminating the asset transfer penalty for SSI (while retaining it only for Medicaid) could create an incentive for individuals to shelter assets specifically to qualify for SSI benefits, undermining the program's means-tested design.