HR-7779-118
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 703.
Sponsored by Celeste Maloy (R-UT)
What it does
This bill would create a legal pathway for volunteers — such as companies, nonprofits, or individuals — to clean up abandoned hardrock mines without becoming liable under federal environmental laws for pollution they did not cause. It would establish a permitting process through the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers allowing these "Good Samaritans" to remediate contaminated mine sites while receiving protection from Clean Water Act and other federal liability. The bill would apply to mines abandoned before a set date that have no solvent, legally responsible owner.
Who benefits
Downstream communities and municipalities whose drinking water sources are contaminated by acid mine drainage from abandoned mines. Aquatic ecosystems and wildlife in affected watersheds. Volunteer cleanup entities — including mining companies, conservation groups, states, and local governments — who want to remediate sites but currently face legal risk for doing so. Western states with high concentrations of abandoned hardrock mines (e.g., Colorado, Montana, Idaho, Nevada). Recreational users of rivers and streams currently degraded by mine pollution.
Who is hurt
Downstream landowners or communities who may lose some legal leverage if a Good Samaritan cleanup is incomplete or worsens conditions, since the permit shield could limit their ability to sue the volunteer. Environmental advocacy groups concerned that the liability waiver could be used to shield inadequate cleanups. The EPA and state agencies, which would bear new administrative burdens of reviewing and issuing permits. Potentially affected tribes whose water rights or treaty-protected resources could be impacted by cleanup activities that alter water flow or sediment.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that thousands of abandoned hardrock mines across the American West are leaching toxic metals — including arsenic, lead, and mercury — into rivers and streams, yet sit untouched because any party that voluntarily begins cleanup risks being held liable under the Clean Water Act for the ongoing pollution they are trying to fix. This legal trap has paralyzed remediation efforts for decades. The bill would break that deadlock by giving responsible volunteers a clear, supervised permit process and liability protection, enabling cleanups that would otherwise never happen. Because these mines have no solvent owner to compel, the choice is not between a Good Samaritan cleanup and a perfect cleanup — it is between a Good Samaritan cleanup and no cleanup at all. The bill includes EPA and Army Corps oversight to ensure cleanups meet environmental standards, protecting communities while finally mobilizing the private and nonprofit resources needed to address a legacy pollution problem the federal government lacks the budget to solve alone.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that creating broad liability shields for volunteer cleaners could be exploited by mining companies seeking to manage their reputational or financial exposure at contaminated sites without accepting full legal accountability for thorough remediation. They contend that a permit shield may leave downstream communities and tribes with no legal recourse if a cleanup is botched, incomplete, or causes new harm — effectively trading one pollution problem for another while closing the courthouse door. Critics also raise concerns that the definition of "abandoned" mine or "no solvent owner" could be drawn in ways that allow currently responsible parties to evade liability by restructuring. Additionally, opponents argue that weakening Clean Water Act enforcement mechanisms — even selectively — sets a precedent that could be expanded over time, eroding the deterrent effect that liability provides. They maintain that adequate federal funding for Superfund and abandoned mine cleanup programs would be a more accountable solution than delegating remediation to volunteers with limited liability.
Constitutional context
The bill rests primarily on Congress's Commerce Clause authority (Art. I, §8), which underpins the Clean Water Act and other federal environmental statutes upheld in cases including Massachusetts v. EPA (2007). By modifying liability under the Clean Water Act, Congress is exercising its power to define the scope of its own statutes — a straightforward legislative function. Post-Loper Bright (2024), any EPA rulemaking to implement the permit program would be subject to independent judicial review rather than deference, meaning courts would scrutinize whether the agency's permit standards are clearly authorized by the bill's text. The Takings Clause (5th Amendment) could be implicated if cleanup activities alter water flow or access in ways that affect private or tribal property. The Tenth Amendment is relevant to the extent the bill preempts or interacts with state-level abandoned mine programs.
Checks and balances
The bill would shift some remediation authority to the Executive Branch (EPA and Army Corps of Engineers) by creating a new permitting program, expanding agency administrative responsibilities. Congress retains authority by setting the statutory conditions for liability protection. State governments may retain concurrent authority depending on how the bill addresses preemption of state environmental laws. Judicial oversight of the permit program would be strengthened post-Loper Bright, as courts would independently interpret the agency's statutory authority rather than deferring to EPA's own reading of the bill.
Historical precedent
The 1994 and subsequent Good Samaritan pilot programs under EPA, and multiple prior congressional attempts to pass similar legislation (including versions in the 109th, 110th, and 115th Congresses), reflect longstanding but unresolved efforts to address this liability barrier. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA/Superfund, 1980) contains a limited Good Samaritan provision for emergency response as a partial precedent.