HR-6751-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Sponsored by Pramila Jayapal (D-WA)
What it does
This bill would repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed on September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40), which authorized the President to use military force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks. The repeal would take effect 240 days after enactment, giving the executive branch a transition window. No replacement authorization is included in the bill.
Who benefits
Members of Congress who argue the legislature has ceded too much war-making authority to the executive branch. Civil liberties advocates who contend the 2001 AUMF has been stretched far beyond its original scope. Populations in countries where U.S. military operations conducted under the 2001 AUMF have caused civilian harm. U.S. service members who would no longer be deployed under this authority. Taxpayers if military operations funded under this authority are reduced.
Who is hurt
U.S. military and intelligence agencies that currently rely on the 2001 AUMF as legal authority for counterterrorism operations in multiple countries, including Somalia, Syria, and elsewhere. Counterterrorism partners and allied governments whose joint operations depend on this legal framework. Populations in regions where U.S. counterterrorism operations have disrupted militant activity, who could face increased security threats. The executive branch, which would lose a broad standing authorization for military action without a replacement.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the 2001 AUMF, originally passed to respond to the September 11 attacks, has been stretched over 24 years to justify military operations in at least 19 countries against groups that did not exist in 2001, far beyond what Congress intended. They contend that the Constitution's Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) vests war-making authority in Congress, and that an open-ended, permanent authorization effectively transfers that power to the executive branch in perpetuity. The 240-day transition period, they argue, gives Congress time to pass a narrower, updated authorization if one is needed.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that repealing the 2001 AUMF without a replacement would create an immediate legal vacuum, stripping the military of the authority needed to conduct ongoing counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, ISIS affiliates, and associated forces in active theaters. They contend that adversaries could exploit the 240-day window and any subsequent legislative gap, and that Congress has repeatedly failed to pass a replacement AUMF despite years of debate, making repeal without a successor authorization operationally reckless. They further argue that existing operations have demonstrably degraded terrorist networks that pose direct threats to American lives.
Constitutional context
The Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) grants Congress the power to declare war, while the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) gives the President authority over military operations once authorized. The 2001 AUMF sits at the intersection of these powers; Congress argues in the bill's findings that executive interpretation of the AUMF has exceeded what the Constitution permits Congress to delegate. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 provides additional statutory context, though its constitutional limits remain contested.
Checks and balances
Congress would reclaim war-making authority by eliminating the executive branch's standing legal basis for a broad range of military operations; the primary check on Congress is the President's veto power, and any replacement AUMF would itself require congressional approval.
Historical precedent
Congress repealed the 2002 Iraq AUMF (Public Law 107-243) in 2024, establishing a direct precedent for sunsetting post-9/11 war authorizations, though the 2001 AUMF covers a broader and more active set of ongoing operations.