HR-5105-115
Received in the Senate. Read twice. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 522.
What it does
The BUILD Act of 2018 would create the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a new federal agency to encourage private-sector participation in economic development in low- and lower-middle-income countries. The DFC would offer loans, loan guarantees, equity investments (as a minority investor), insurance, technical assistance, and other financial tools to support development projects abroad. It would absorb the existing Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and certain functions of USAID, and would automatically terminate after seven years unless reauthorized.
Who benefits
U.S. private businesses and investors seeking to enter or expand in developing markets, who would gain access to government-backed financing and risk insurance. Developing countries — particularly low- and lower-middle-income economies — whose populations could benefit from increased private capital flows, infrastructure, and job creation. U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, as the DFC would serve as a tool to advance American strategic objectives abroad. USAID and OPIC personnel whose functions would be consolidated and continued under the new agency.
Who is hurt
U.S. competitors in developing markets (including state-backed foreign enterprises) that currently operate without facing U.S.-backed private competition. Taxpayers who bear financial risk if DFC-backed loans, guarantees, or equity investments result in losses. Countries whose governments have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism, who would be explicitly excluded from DFC assistance. Private sector entities engaged in monopolistic practices, who would be ineligible for DFC support. OPIC employees and USAID staff whose roles, reporting structures, and job functions would change during the transition and consolidation.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the DFC would give the United States a more powerful and flexible tool to compete with state-backed development finance institutions from rival nations, which have used infrastructure lending and investment to expand their geopolitical influence in developing regions. By mobilizing private capital rather than relying solely on government grants or aid, the DFC would stretch U.S. development dollars further, potentially generating returns that offset costs to taxpayers. Supporters also contend that consolidating OPIC and relevant USAID functions into a single, modernized agency would eliminate bureaucratic duplication, streamline decision-making, and allow the U.S. to respond more nimbly to development opportunities. The seven-year sunset clause, they argue, builds in accountability by requiring Congress to affirmatively reauthorize the agency based on demonstrated results.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that creating a new federal agency with broad authority to make loans, take equity stakes, and issue insurance exposes U.S. taxpayers to significant financial risk, particularly in politically unstable or economically fragile countries where development projects frequently fail. Critics contend that government-backed financing can distort private markets by subsidizing investments that would not otherwise be commercially viable, potentially crowding out purely private capital or propping up projects that serve political rather than economic goals. Some argue that the DFC's mandate to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives could compromise the neutrality and effectiveness of development assistance, directing resources toward strategically convenient countries rather than those with the greatest need. Others raise concerns that absorbing OPIC and USAID functions could disrupt ongoing programs and create transitional instability that harms the populations these programs serve.