HR-4361-119
Referred to the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit.
Sponsored by Eric Crawford (R-AR)
What it does
This bill would prohibit the use of federal transportation funds to purchase rolling stock (buses, rail cars, etc.) or electric powertrains produced or provided by companies linked to China or other "covered nations" as defined in existing defense law. It would also ban federal funding for fueling or charging infrastructure built specifically to support those vehicles. The U.S. Trade Representative, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation, would be required to publish and regularly update a public list of prohibited companies within 30 days of enactment.
Who benefits
U.S.-based transit vehicle manufacturers (such as domestic bus and rail car producers) who would face less competition from Chinese-linked companies for federally funded contracts. American workers in domestic vehicle manufacturing. Transit agencies that currently use non-covered vehicles, who would face no disruption. National security and intelligence communities concerned about data collection or surveillance capabilities embedded in foreign-made transit technology. Domestic electric vehicle component suppliers who could fill demand previously met by Chinese-linked suppliers.
Who is hurt
Transit agencies — particularly smaller or underfunded ones — that currently rely on lower-cost Chinese-linked vehicles (e.g., BYD electric buses) and may face higher procurement costs or reduced purchasing power. Riders in those transit systems who could see service reductions or fare increases if agencies face budget shortfalls. Chinese-linked vehicle manufacturers and their U.S.-based subsidiaries or partners. U.S. companies that have joint ventures or supply chain relationships with covered entities. Taxpayers in jurisdictions where transit agencies must pay more per vehicle. Workers employed by affected foreign-linked manufacturers operating in the U.S.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that Chinese state-subsidized manufacturers like CRRC and BYD have used below-market pricing to capture a growing share of U.S. transit contracts, threatening the long-term viability of domestic manufacturers. They contend that vehicles and components from Chinese-linked companies pose documented national security risks — including potential data collection on passenger movements and infrastructure vulnerabilities — consistent with concerns Congress already acted on in the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act. They further argue that federal taxpayer dollars should not subsidize foreign state-directed industrial policy designed to undermine American supply chains.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the bill's broad definition of "covered entity" — extending to affiliates, subsidiaries, joint ventures, and entities with any indirect Chinese ownership — could sweep in companies with only marginal ties to China, restricting competition and driving up costs for cash-strapped transit agencies. They contend that fewer eligible vendors means less competitive bidding, potentially costing transit systems tens of millions of dollars per procurement cycle at a time when many agencies are already facing funding shortfalls. They also argue that the bill delegates significant list-making authority to the USTR with limited procedural safeguards, raising questions about due process for companies that may be incorrectly designated.
Constitutional context
Congress has broad authority under the Spending Clause (Art. I, §8) to attach conditions to federal grants, including procurement restrictions — a power consistently upheld by courts. However, the bill delegates list-making authority to the USTR with limited statutory guidance on designation criteria, which could face scrutiny under the nondelegation doctrine and, post-Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024), courts would independently assess whether the USTR's designations fall within the statutory authority Congress actually granted rather than deferring to the agency's interpretation.
Checks and balances
Congress sets the prohibition and conditions on federal funds; the Executive Branch (USTR, DOT, and Attorney General) gains authority to designate covered entities and administer the list, with limited explicit congressional oversight mechanisms built into the bill.
Historical precedent
Section 3188 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) previously prohibited FTA funds from being used to procure rail rolling stock from CRRC and other Chinese state-owned manufacturers, establishing the direct statutory predecessor this bill expands upon.