HR-3919-117
Became Public Law No: 117-55.
Sponsored by Steve Scalise (R-LA)
What it does
This law directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to write rules permanently stopping it from reviewing or approving any application to authorize communications equipment that the FCC has already placed on its "covered list" — a list of equipment and services the agency has determined pose an unacceptable risk to national security or the safety of U.S. persons. In effect, it closes a procedural pathway that previously allowed companies to seek FCC approval for listed equipment on a case-by-case basis.
Who benefits
U.S. telecommunications network operators who want a clear, uniform standard for which equipment is prohibited; domestic communications equipment manufacturers who compete against listed foreign companies (notably Huawei and ZTE); federal agencies and contractors that rely on secure communications infrastructure; rural broadband providers that have already removed listed equipment and sought reimbursement; and members of the public whose personal data travels over U.S. communications networks.
Who is hurt
Foreign communications equipment manufacturers whose products are on the covered list (primarily Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE), who lose any remaining avenue to obtain FCC authorization in the U.S. market; U.S. importers and resellers of listed equipment; small and rural telecommunications carriers that purchased listed equipment before the ban and now face replacement costs; and consumers in underserved areas where listed equipment was widely deployed due to its lower cost, who may experience service disruptions or delays during equipment transitions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that allowing the FCC to continue reviewing authorization applications for equipment already deemed a national security threat created an exploitable loophole — one that could let adversarial foreign technology enter U.S. networks through a bureaucratic side door. They contend that a bright-line prohibition removes ambiguity, strengthens the integrity of U.S. communications infrastructure, and sends a clear signal to allies and adversaries alike that security-risk equipment has no path to approval. Supporters also argue the law simply enforces a determination Congress and the FCC had already made: that certain equipment is too dangerous to permit, making further case-by-case review not just unnecessary but potentially harmful.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that eliminating all case-by-case review removes a procedural safeguard that could allow legitimate, narrow exceptions — for example, for research, testing, or legacy systems with no viable replacement. They contend the law may impose disproportionate costs on small and rural carriers that relied on lower-cost listed equipment in good faith, and that replacement funding has not kept pace with the mandate. Opponents also raise due process concerns, arguing that permanently barring equipment authorization without any individualized review may be challenged as an unconstitutional bill of attainder or a taking, and that the broad prohibition could sweep in equipment that poses minimal actual risk depending on how the covered list evolves over time.
Constitutional context
The law implicates several constitutional provisions. The Commerce Clause grants Congress authority to regulate communications equipment entering U.S. markets. The FCC's authority derives from the Communications Act, and post-Loper Bright, courts will independently assess whether the FCC's covered-list determinations and implementing rules fall within its statutory authority rather than deferring to the agency. Due Process (Fifth Amendment) concerns arise if equipment makers argue they are denied a meaningful opportunity to contest their listing. The law could also face a Bill of Attainder challenge if courts view it as legislative punishment of specific named companies. First Amendment considerations are limited but present if equipment restrictions affect expressive platforms. Carpenter v. U.S. (2018) is relevant background on the constitutional sensitivity of communications infrastructure.
Checks and balances
The law shifts authority toward the legislative branch by codifying a hard prohibition that removes FCC discretion to grant case-by-case approvals — constraining executive agency flexibility. The FCC (executive branch) retains authority to maintain and update the covered list, but loses the ability to grant exceptions through the authorization process. Congress effectively overrides any future agency judgment that a particular application from a listed manufacturer might be permissible.
Historical precedent
The Export Administration Act and related export control regimes have historically restricted foreign technology from U.S. markets on national security grounds. The FCC's earlier 2019 order barring use of Universal Service Fund money for listed equipment (under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019) is the direct legislative predecessor to this law.