HR-3766-119
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 565.
What it does
This bill would prohibit the District of Columbia from requiring any court or administrative tribunal to defer to the Mayor of DC or a DC agency when interpreting a statute or regulation that the Mayor or agency administers. It would also repeal DC's Review of Agency Action Clarification Amendment Act of 2025 (D.C. Law 26-37) and restore any laws that Act had changed or repealed.
Who benefits
DC residents and businesses who challenge Mayor or agency decisions in court, as judges would independently interpret the law rather than defaulting to the executive's reading. Attorneys and litigants who believe DC agencies have applied statutes too broadly or incorrectly. Small businesses and property owners subject to DC regulatory enforcement. Congress, which would reassert oversight authority over DC governance. Federal courts reviewing DC administrative actions.
Who is hurt
The DC Mayor's office and DC executive agencies, which would lose the legal advantage of having their statutory interpretations presumed correct. DC government attorneys who have relied on deference doctrine in litigation. DC residents who benefit from consistent, agency-developed expertise in complex regulatory areas such as housing, health, and environmental rules. The DC Council, whose 2025 law establishing the deference framework would be nullified. DC's ability to govern its own administrative law without congressional interference.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that requiring courts to defer to the executive branch's interpretation of the law undermines judicial independence and allows agencies to expand their own power beyond what the legislature intended. They contend that the Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Loper Bright — which overruled federal Chevron deference — reflects a broad consensus that courts, not executive agencies, should be the final word on what the law means. Applying that same principle to DC, they argue, protects DC residents from an unchecked executive and ensures that the Mayor cannot unilaterally expand agency authority through favorable self-interpretation.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that this bill is an unwarranted intrusion by Congress into DC's local self-governance, overriding a law the DC Council democratically enacted to manage its own administrative law system. They contend that DC agencies possess specialized expertise in local conditions — housing, public health, zoning — and that stripping deference may produce inconsistent judicial rulings that undermine effective local regulation. Critics further argue that Congress is selectively applying the Loper Bright rationale only to DC, a jurisdiction it controls, while leaving other local governments free to set their own deference standards, raising concerns about DC's unique lack of voting representation and autonomy.
Constitutional context
Congress holds plenary authority over the District of Columbia under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution, which grants Congress exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the seat of government. This broad authority means the bill does not face the same federalism constraints that would apply to legislation directed at states. No Equal Protection or Due Process challenge is clearly implicated, though DC's lack of voting representation in Congress is a recurring political — if not strictly legal — concern.
Checks and balances
DC courts and administrative tribunals would gain interpretive independence, while the DC Mayor's office and executive agencies would lose the legal presumption that their statutory readings are correct; Congress retains ultimate oversight authority over DC law under the District Clause.
Historical precedent
The Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo overruled federal Chevron deference, and several states have similarly moved to limit or eliminate state-level agency deference doctrines in recent years.