HR-31-116
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 107.
What it does
This bill would impose economic sanctions on foreign individuals and institutions that provide significant support to the Syrian government, or to those acting on behalf of Russia or Iran in Syria, and on those responsible for serious human rights abuses against Syrian civilians. It would direct the Treasury Department to evaluate the Central Bank of Syria as a potential money laundering concern and apply special financial restrictions if warranted. The bill would also authorize the State Department to assist in gathering evidence for war crimes prosecutions, while exempting humanitarian aid and democracy-support activities from its sanctions.
Who benefits
Syrian civilians who may be shielded from further violence through economic pressure on the Assad government and its allies. U.S. and allied financial institutions that gain clearer legal guidance on prohibited transactions. Human rights organizations and war crimes investigators who would receive State Department support. Syrian opposition groups and pro-democracy entities, which are explicitly exempted from sanctions. Humanitarian aid organizations operating in Syria, which are also exempted.
Who is hurt
Foreign businesses and individuals — including those in Russia, Iran, and third-party countries — that currently conduct trade or financial transactions with the Syrian government and would face asset freezes and U.S. entry bans. The Central Bank of Syria and Syrian financial institutions subject to enhanced restrictions. Companies in the aerospace, petroleum, and defense sectors that supply goods or services to Syria's military or government. Individuals in those sectors who could face personal sanctions. Syrian government officials and military figures named under human rights provisions.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that targeted economic sanctions are one of the most effective non-military tools available to hold the Assad government and its backers accountable for documented atrocities — including the use of chemical weapons and the systematic torture of civilians, as evidenced by the "Caesar" photographs that inspired the bill's name. They contend that cutting off financial lifelines to Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran reduces the resources available to continue the conflict and signals to the international community that such conduct carries real consequences. Supporters also note that the bill's humanitarian and democracy exemptions are carefully designed to protect civilian aid operations, ensuring that ordinary Syrians are not further harmed by the sanctions. Finally, they argue that assisting war crimes investigators strengthens the rule of international law and deters future atrocities.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that broad secondary sanctions — penalizing third-country businesses and governments for their dealings with Syria — can strain relationships with U.S. allies and trading partners who have their own diplomatic and economic interests in the region. They contend that sanctions historically have a mixed record of changing the behavior of entrenched authoritarian governments, and that economic pressure may deepen civilian suffering by further destabilizing Syria's already fragile economy. Critics also raise concerns that expansive presidential discretion to designate sanctioned parties, with limited congressional oversight, concentrates foreign policy power in the executive branch. Some argue that the bill's exemptions for humanitarian aid may be too narrow in practice, creating legal uncertainty for NGOs and relief organizations operating in complex conflict environments.
Constitutional context
The bill operates under the President's foreign affairs powers (Article II) and Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce (Article I, Section 8) and define offenses against the law of nations. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the statutory framework for most U.S. sanctions regimes. Relevant cases include Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), which addressed the boundary between executive and legislative authority in foreign affairs, and Trump v. Hawaii (2018), which affirmed broad executive discretion in national security and immigration decisions affecting foreign nationals. The bill's secondary sanctions provisions — targeting non-U.S. persons for conduct outside U.S. territory — also implicate questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law.
Checks and balances
The bill shifts meaningful authority to the executive branch: the President holds broad discretion to designate sanctioned individuals and entities, suspend sanctions in the national security interest, and determine which goods or services trigger penalties. Congress retains influence through the bill's statutory mandates and reporting requirements, but does not require congressional approval for individual designations or suspensions. The Treasury and State Departments gain new administrative authority, while foreign persons subject to sanctions have limited avenues for judicial review under existing IEEPA frameworks.
Historical precedent
The Magnitsky Act (2012) and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (2016) established similar frameworks for sanctioning foreign individuals responsible for human rights abuses. The Iran Sanctions Act (1996) and Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (2017) provide precedent for secondary sanctions targeting third-country actors who support designated governments.