HJRES-153-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Sponsored by Nydia Velázquez (D-NY)
What it does
This joint resolution would direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities within or against Cuba that have not been authorized by a congressional declaration of war or a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). It would apply to all military components, including the U.S. Coast Guard conducting a blockade or quarantine of Cuba. The resolution includes a carve-out allowing the U.S. to continue defending itself against an armed attack, an imminent armed attack, or to conduct lawful counternarcotics operations.
Who benefits
Members of the U.S. Armed Forces who would not be deployed into unauthorized hostilities against Cuba. Cuban civilians who could be harmed by U.S. military action. Members of Congress who support reasserting legislative war powers authority. Diplomatic and international law communities that favor adherence to formal war authorization processes. U.S. taxpayers who would not bear costs of an unauthorized military engagement.
Who is hurt
The executive branch would lose flexibility to conduct or sustain military operations against Cuba without returning to Congress for authorization. U.S. national security planners who argue rapid response capability requires presidential discretion. Cuban exile and diaspora communities in the U.S. who may support more assertive U.S. military posture toward the Cuban government. Allies or partners who coordinate with the U.S. on Cuba-related security operations that could be disrupted.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution's Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) unambiguously grants Congress — not the President — the sole power to authorize offensive military hostilities, and that any military action against Cuba without a declaration of war or AUMF is unconstitutional. They contend the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was enacted precisely to prevent unauthorized presidential military engagements, and that this resolution enforces that framework as Congress intended. They further argue that the carve-out for self-defense and counternarcotics preserves all legitimate executive military authority while closing the door on unauthorized offensive action.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that the resolution is premised on a hypothetical — no publicly confirmed unauthorized U.S. military hostilities against Cuba are currently underway — making it a political statement rather than a practical constraint. They contend that the President's Commander-in-Chief authority (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) and the broad discretion affirmed in cases like Trump v. Hawaii (2018) give the executive branch necessary flexibility to respond to rapidly evolving threats in the Caribbean, and that legislating specific geographic restrictions on military action could telegraph strategic limitations to adversaries and undermine national security.
Constitutional context
The Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) grants Congress the power to declare war, while the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) gives the President authority over military operations once authorized. The longstanding tension between these provisions — and the scope of the 1973 War Powers Resolution — is the central constitutional issue here. The bill explicitly invokes the War Powers Resolution framework, which has never been definitively ruled upon by the Supreme Court as to its constitutionality or enforceability against a sitting President.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain authority to halt unauthorized military operations against Cuba; the executive branch retains Commander-in-Chief power for self-defense and counternarcotics, but would be constrained from initiating or sustaining offensive hostilities without a formal congressional authorization.
Historical precedent
Congress has passed similar War Powers Resolution-based joint resolutions directing troop withdrawals from specific conflicts, including resolutions related to Yemen (passed by Congress in 2019 and 2020, vetoed by President Trump) and Somalia, establishing a pattern of legislative attempts to reassert war powers authority over specific geographic theaters.