HCONRES-106-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
What it does
This bill would direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities conducted within or against Cuba that have not been explicitly authorized by Congress. It is a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res.), meaning it expresses the sense of both chambers of Congress but does not carry the force of law on its own. The bill does not define what specific hostilities it is responding to, nor does it set a timeline for withdrawal.
Who benefits
U.S. military personnel who may be engaged in or at risk from unauthorized hostilities near Cuba. Members of Congress who argue their war-authorization powers have been bypassed. Cuban civilians who could be affected by U.S. military activity. Advocates for stricter congressional oversight of executive war-making power. Diplomatic and foreign policy actors who favor de-escalation with Cuba.
Who is hurt
The executive branch, which would lose flexibility to conduct military operations near Cuba without prior congressional approval. U.S. national security and intelligence agencies that may rely on operational flexibility in the region. Allies or partners who coordinate with the U.S. on Cuba-related security matters. Members of Congress and policy advocates who believe the President needs broad unilateral authority to respond quickly to threats in the Western Hemisphere.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution's Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) vests Congress — not the President — with the authority to initiate hostilities, and that any military engagement against Cuba without congressional authorization is unconstitutional. They contend the War Powers Resolution of 1973 already requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of deploying forces into hostilities and to withdraw them within 60 days absent authorization, and that this bill reinforces that existing legal framework. They further argue that concurrent resolutions of this type are a legitimate and historically used tool for Congress to assert its war powers prerogatives.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a concurrent resolution lacks the force of law and cannot constitutionally compel the President to withdraw forces, as the Supreme Court's framework and the INS v. Chadha (1983) decision cast doubt on legislative vetoes that bypass the President's signature. They contend that the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) grants the President inherent authority to conduct limited military operations and respond to threats without a formal declaration of war, a power exercised by virtually every modern president. They also argue the bill's vague language — referencing unspecified "hostilities" — could create operational uncertainty and hamper the President's ability to protect U.S. interests and personnel in the region.
Constitutional context
The bill sits at the core tension between the Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11), which grants Congress the power to authorize hostilities, and the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1), which gives the President broad authority over military operations. Because this is a concurrent resolution rather than a joint resolution or statute, its legal enforceability is also in question — INS v. Chadha (1983) held that congressional actions with the force of law must pass through both chambers and be presented to the President.
Checks and balances
Congress would assert authority to direct troop withdrawals, limiting executive military discretion; however, because this is a concurrent resolution rather than binding legislation, the President retains practical authority to continue operations, and no veto override mechanism applies.
Historical precedent
Congress has used concurrent resolutions to direct troop withdrawals under the War Powers Resolution framework before, including H.Con.Res. 21 (2023), which directed the removal of U.S. forces from Syria — a directly analogous use of this mechanism.