HCONRES-106-119
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
What it does
This concurrent resolution would invoke Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)) to direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from any hostilities within or against Cuba that have not been authorized by Congress. The removal would be required unless Congress explicitly authorizes military action through a formal declaration of war or a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). As a concurrent resolution, it would not be presented to the President for signature and would not carry the force of law on its own.
Who benefits
Members of Congress who argue the legislature's war-making authority has been eroded. Cuban civilians who could be harmed by U.S. military action. U.S. service members who would be withdrawn from an unauthorized conflict. Advocates for strict constitutional separation of war powers. Diplomatic and foreign policy actors who prefer non-military engagement with Cuba.
Who is hurt
The executive branch would lose flexibility to conduct or sustain military operations against Cuba without congressional approval. U.S. allies or partners who may rely on American military posture in the region. Any Cuban opposition groups or actors who might benefit from U.S. military pressure on the Cuban government. Defense contractors or personnel involved in any ongoing operations that would be curtailed.
Supporters argue
Supporters argue that the Constitution's Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) vests war-making authority in Congress, not the President, and that the War Powers Resolution was enacted precisely to reclaim that authority from executive overreach. They contend that any U.S. military hostilities against Cuba conducted without a declaration of war or AUMF are unconstitutional by design, and that this resolution enforces the legal framework Congress established in 1973 to prevent undeclared wars.
Opponents argue
Opponents argue that a concurrent resolution lacks the force of law under INS v. Chadha (1983), which held that Congress cannot exercise legislative power through a resolution that bypasses the President's veto — meaning this measure may be constitutionally ineffective as a binding directive. They further contend that the President's Commander-in-Chief authority (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) provides independent constitutional basis for limited military operations, and that restricting executive flexibility could undermine national security and rapid-response capabilities in the Western Hemisphere.
Constitutional context
The Declare War Clause (Art. I, §8, cl. 11) gives Congress the power to declare war, while the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Art. II, §2, cl. 1) gives the President command of the military — a tension that has never been fully resolved by the Supreme Court. The War Powers Resolution's concurrent resolution mechanism was itself called into constitutional question by INS v. Chadha (1983), which struck down legislative vetoes that bypass presentment to the President.
Checks and balances
Congress would gain a formal assertion of its war-authorization power over Cuba operations; the primary check on this resolution is the President's ability to contest its legal enforceability, given that concurrent resolutions are not presented to the President for signature or veto.
Historical precedent
Congress has previously invoked the War Powers Resolution's concurrent resolution mechanism to direct troop withdrawals, most notably in resolutions related to Yemen (2019) and Somalia, though presidents have consistently disputed the binding legal force of such measures.